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ABSTRACT 
Mobile devices, given their promise of mobility with rich functionality, are being 
deployed with broadening use cases throughout the United States Department of 
Defense. All the while, massive quantities of information are stored and accessed 
by these devices without there being a comprehensive and specialized security 
policy dedicated to protecting that information. The importance of having a 
security policy grows as these devices start providing new capabilities and 
replacing many information systems we currently have deployed. Since the same 
device will be used in many different contexts, each with potentially different 
security policies, the devices will have to be able to adapt to those contexts. The 
security policy(ies) enforced by the device will have to adapt accordingly. 
We investigate potential mobile computing security policies to balance this 
request for context aware functionality with the information assurance required of 
these government devices. We investigate the security issues raised in the use 
of these devices and provide example security policies that address some of 
these issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
A. THESIS STATEMENT AND MOTIVATIONS 
Since the announcement of the iPhone on 7 January 2007, a revolution 
has taken place in the mobile cell phone market that has changed phones into 
mobile computing devices. These devices are now being deployed into the 
battlefield and connecting to the Global Information Grid (GIG). In the commercial 
sector, corporations are now joining the Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
movement. All the while, massive quantities of information are stored and 
accessed by these devices without a comprehensive and specialized security 
policy dedicated to protecting it.     
The Army has requested that the capabilities of these devices be 
delivered rapidly to the battlefield. Programs like Joint Battle Command-Platform 
(JBC-P) [1], Raytheon’s Android Tactical System (RATS) [2] and Army 
Marketplace [3] are advancing the use of these handheld devices in the military 
to meet this demand. The United States Chief Information Officer (CIO) would 
like to start allowing these devices in the civilian government with the possible 
use of a public app store and secure private app stores in one device. The 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has already 
deployed 50 iPads, with interest in deploying 50 additional devices. Despite the 
desire to rapidly deploy these devices, little attention has been paid to their 
security and the secure integration of these devices into the GIG. The importance 
of a security policy grows as these devices start providing new capabilities and 
replacing many information systems we currently have deployed. Since these 
devices will be used in many different contexts each with potentially different 
security requirements, the devices will have to be able to adapt to those contexts. 
The security policy(ies) of the device will have to adapt accordingly.   
We propose developing a mobile computing security policy to balance this 
request for functionality with the information assurance required of these 
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government devices. We provide examples of the security issues raised in the 
use of these devices and of potential policies that might be used.  
B. THESIS SCOPE AND LAYOUT 
This study applies to United States (U.S.) Government uses of mobile 
devices at the classified and unclassified levels for the full scope of Department 
of Defense (DoD) uses from the administrative to battlefield functions. In this 
thesis, we  first attempt to define modern colloquial meaning of a mobile device, 
how they may be useful for DoD, and the reason a security policy is needed for 
these devices. Then, starting in Chapter II, we discuss the types of mobile 
devices and security policies as they relate to mobile devices by first describing 
what is a security policy, how to develop a security policy, what are the current 
DoD security policies. In Chapter III we suggest a future leaning approach to 
implementing mobile device security. Chapter IV will conclude with topics for 
future research and final thoughts on mobile device security. 
C. WHAT IS A “MOBILE DEVICE” 
Mobile computing devices or simply “mobile devices” for short come in 
many different forms, such as personal data assistants, smart phones, and 
tablets. Today, the most popular mobile devices are characterized by their size or 
“handheld” status, touch sensitive screens versus keyboards and mice, and 
wireless connectivity. They include devices commonly called “tablets” and 
devices doubling as cell phones, which are commonly called “smart phones.”  
Mobile devices although very small and primarily used to consume digital content 
are also used to do many of the same things we expect from a traditional 
computer such as a desktop or laptop.   
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently 
published their Special Publication 800–124 Revision 1 titled “Guidelines for 
Managing and Securing Mobile Devices in the Enterprise” [4] in which they define 
mobile devices as having the following characteristics: 
 3
 A small form factor 
 At least one wireless network interface for Internet access (data 
communications). This interface uses Wi-Fi, cellular networking, or 
other technologies that connect the mobile device to network 
infrastructures with Internet connectivity. 
 Local built-in (non-removable) data storage 
 An operating system that is not a full-fledged desktop or laptop 
operating system 
 Applications available through multiple methods (provided with the 
operating system, accessed through web browser, acquired and 
installed from third parties) 
 Built-in features for synchronizing local data with a remote location 
(desktop or laptop computer, organization servers, 
telecommunications provider servers, other third party servers, 
etc.).  [4] 
The above is a good description of current mobile device technology. 
However, this paper considers a more expansive view of mobile devices and the 
future of mobile devices by choosing to focus on the “personnel” aspect of the 
device rather than the current capability and form. Another key aspect of these 
devices is how they serve as the catalyst for the fusion of information from 
multiple sources, at least from the owner’s point of view, where there is a synergy 
provided to that user because all the information is presented in a consumable 
and personal fashion. Therefore, the device must be able to enforce the security 
policy as intended for each “flavor” of data handled on behalf of the user which is 
what makes the analysis of mobile device security policy more interesting and 
complex. 
For the purposes of this paper, the term “mobile device” will mean a small 
and extremely light-weight personal computing device which uses as a primary 
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interface something other than the traditional keyboard, is connected via wireless 
technologies for data connection, is designed to operate predominantly on 
battery power, and is of a size and dimension such that it is easily transportable 
or wearable by a single person. Current examples of such devices are the 
iPhone, the iPad, Android OS phones, Android Tablets, Google Glass, and many 
other similar devices [5]. However, the future may bring wearable devices such 
as the new Google Glass, computers built into clothing, or any other conceivable 
device meant for personal data processing. 
D. MOBILE DEVICE USES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
A powerful and highly mobile computing platform, today’s mobile devices 
offer a near desktop replacement in the palm of your hand. Mobile devices are so 
abundantly featured they offer solutions for many of today’s information centric 
problems. From the dedicated executive to the soldier in the battlefield, these 
devices are highly sought after for the freedom they offer in terms mobile 
productivity [6], [7]. As a replacement to less mobile and less agile solutions, 
mobile devices are already being integrated into DoD operations.   Mobile 
devices are being considered for several DoD projects.   Some of these projects 
are:  Air Force Judge Advocate General (JAG) replacement for Paper 
Documents; Air Force Electronic Flight Book for Aircraft Operations to replace 
heavy paper checklists and maps; Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P); 
Raytheon’s Android Tactical System (RATS); and the Army Marketplace.    
This movement in the military is lagging behind the consumer 
marketplace.   As of February 2012, 71 percent of U.S. adults in the 25 to 34 age 
bracket already own a Smartphone [8]. Along with these personal mobile 
devices, employers are also providing an additional mobile device. As a result, 
many professionals carry at least two mobile devices [8]. The juggling between 
these mobile solutions can cause professionals frustration, wishing for a  
simpler solution. This frustration along with the ability for “management to avoid 
upfront costs of mobile devices” [8] has led to the Bring Your Own Device 
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(BYOD) movement. With BYOD, employees bring their own mobile device for 
use by their employer.  “This is already common in many businesses. In a 2012 
Cisco survey performed in the U.S., 95 percent of respondents said that their 
organizations permit employee-owned devices in some way, shape, or form in 
the workplace” [8]. 
As this replacement and movement takes place, these mobile devices will 
dramatically increase the number of data owners accessing one device beyond 
currently deployed information systems. This issue is made additionally complex 
because mobile devices are highly available (always on), regularly reside on 
one’s person (always on you), and often record and interpreting environmental 
data for context (contextually aware through sensors). These three conditions 
have increased the amount of information available to these devices. 
Additionally, these devices are used by individuals to fill information technology 
and communications needs across all the roles in their life. An example of such 
roles could include a DoD employee who is a father, volunteer firefighter, and 
active church member; or an accountant who is a son, military reservist, and 
woodsman. The user expects to use the mobile device to support these roles and 
all activities that accompany them. It is this combination of activities on one 
device with its combined information that raises information assurance 
considerations for both the employer’s security and user’s privacy. This thesis 
attempts to address these considerations through a security construct that would 
be enforced on these mobile devices. 
In order to describe mobile devices and their corresponding security 
policy, we must first describe the environment for which mobile devices reside. 
To accomplish this we introduce the following terminology:   
 Community of Interest (COI):  Services provided by a community 
of information systems of like interest and/or purpose that operate 
with the same overall information protection needs. 
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 Personality:  A label for information and applications on a mobile 
device that guarantees a given set of protection required by the 
related COI.  
From the environmental definitions above, we propose that a mobile 
device consists of a single or multiple personalities defined by three values: COI, 
User, and physical mobile device. Personalities serve as a container or domain 
within the mobile device for information owned by the corresponding COI. COIs 
are a collection of service providers and the communications infrastructure 
corresponding to the capabilities and services offered to a user towards fulfilling 
a particular role within that community or organization. The COI communication 
infrastructure can vary greatly in a physical and virtual sense. A COI could 
consist of a set of applications, servers, or the entire communication 
infrastructure. 
For mobile devices, commercial service providers, such as the Sprint, 
AT&T, or Verizon provide the vast majority of the COI communication 
infrastructure. However, there are multiple technical mechanisms to 
communicate with a COI. Wi-Fi would be an example of such a mechanism that 
could be provided publicly, personally, or directly by the COI. The battlefield 
would be a specific example of a COI providing the entire technical ability to 
communicate with that COI. In this example, the DoD implements GIG 
communication infrastructures that are specific to a single COI and may be 
completely physically or logically isolated from other communications 
infrastructures. Additionally, the segregation of COI communications 
infrastructure may be virtual, in the form of encrypted communications and virtual 
private networks (VPN).    
1. High-Level Functionality Requirements 
In order to define the security policy, high-level functional requirements 
must be clear for all information systems that communicate with the device. 
Since the functional requirements and security policies are already defined for 
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standard information systems, we have focused on functional requirements 
centered around mobile devices. Mobile devices can provide “unique” and 
“enhanced” functionality in comparison to the standard information systems 
currently used today. These two categories (unique and enhanced) are used for 
defining the combined high-level functional requirements for mobile devices. The 
first category of functionality is “unique” to mobile devices:  
 Dynamic User-Centric Intelligence (DUCI):  Right information at 
the right time, as it relates to the user. The mobile device is able to 
provide the information required based on an ecosystem that 
consists of the user’s role, information, and behavior, as well as the 
context of situation, and location. This information would 
automatically be provided when the ecosystem calls for it. 
Examples from above could include: 
 When a meeting is scheduled at a remote location, the traffic 
could be checked with the time of arrival calculated from 
your current position. An alert could then be sent to the user 
about when to leave. If the device notices that the user will 
be late, it could notify the person being met or even rebook 
flights. 
 When the user is interested in a specific topic or waiting on 
an announcement, the mobile device could notify the user of 
any changes in information. The mobile device could provide 
potential actions that can be taken from current location. 
 Military forces could be automatically notified of downed 
essential services or population unrest prior to entering an 
area with local populace.   
 Mobile devices that receive alerts on hostile forces, hazards, 
and roadblocks could automatically reroute the user around 
it using the navigational unit. 
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 On-Demand Agile Communication (ODAC):  Communicate 
continuously the way you want and when you want. The mobile 
device should support a wide variety of communication options that 
are always available. These options should include support for 
communication across short and long distance. It should also 
support communications among devices when no external 
networks are available. The device should allow the user to choose 
the way that communication should occur. The device should also 
allow the user to provide information in the format that best fits the 
user’s requirements, despite the communication path chosen. 
Examples from above could include: 
 Ammunition that is tracked by the mobile devices. These 
mobile devices could send alerts to command and logistics 
personnel when ammunition supplies are running low. 
 Military personnel could tag friendly and hostile forces in an 
augmented reality from their headgear or weaponry with 
immediate availability of the data to all military personnel on 
the battlefield. 
 Context Aware (CoAw):  Able to capture knowledge of its 
surroundings. The mobile device should be capable of capturing 
sensory data from its environment. This should include items such 
as visual data, audio data, motion, precise location, and signals 
transmitted through the airwaves. Examples from above could 
include: 
 Location and map data from the military’s mobile devices 
could allow for automatic calculation of gaps in defenses and 
the level of enemy penetration enabling corrective actions to 
take place more rapidly. 
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 Mobile devices could enhance the tracking and identification 
of legitimate authority figures, criminals, terrorists, and 
hostile groups within local population from photos in field and 
facial recognition. 
 Human Interface (HI):  Human interface which provides for the 
least amount of effort by the user to provide input to the device. The 
mobile device should have the capability of providing multiple 
methods of interacting with the device. The user should be able to 
choose the method of interacting based on the device, application, 
and situation. Examples from above could include: 
 The mobile device could allow for automatic verbal 
translation of local population to increase cooperation. 
 Military personnel could tag key terrain with decisive 
advantages or key enemy resources to deprive in an 
augmented reality through gestures. 
 Data On-Demand (DoDe):  Provides for real-time to near-real-time 
information. The mobile device should provide a capability to 
provide information in real-time or near-real-time to the user. Since 
mobile devices are “always on and on me” devices, the user would 
also receive the information in near-real-time. 
 Live heads up display with friendly and hostel forces 
locations. 
 Live status of project progression and road blocks 
 Individual Assignment (InAs):  The device has one user that it 
supports throughout its lifetime. The devices are not shared by 
multiple users because they are personal mobile devices. They are 
distributed widely with each user having at least one. 
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The second category of functionality for mobile devices is “enhanced.”  
This category of functionality includes utilities performed on our current 
information systems, but have broadened use cases when implemented on 
mobile devices.   
 Information Processing (InPr):  The mobile device should provide 
the capability to process information locally and remotely based on 
user and application requirements. When remote processing is not 
available, the applications should provide the capability of local 
processing when feasible. 
 Integrated Social Framework (ISF):  The mobile device should 
provide a capability to connect socially, based on user role, to all 
applications hosted on the device.  
 Information Fusion (InFu):  Shares information to authorized 
devices/users. The mobile device should provide the capability of 
sharing information with other authorized devices, users, and 
content providers. 
 Security Policy Enforcement (SPE):  Maintains confidentiality, 
Integrity and availability of the data.  
 Knows the user (KU) (Has knowledge of the user):  The device 
should have the capability of identifying the user and the role with 
which the user is currently performing. The device should also have 
the capability of knowing the user holistically. This would involve 
the fusion of information as it relates to the user. The device should 
then be capable of contextually identifying the role under which the 
user is currently operating.   This would also allow the device to 
execute commands with a higher level of accuracy given the 
enhanced level detail that mobile devices contains about their user. 
 Secure Multirole Integration (SMI) (Multiple-personalities):  The 
device is able to support the different roles that a user takes on 
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throughout the lifetime of the device. The device should be able to 
maintain the integrity and confidentiality of each roles data, but also 
be able to display it as desired with as little user intervention as 
possible. 
 Dynamic Capability Provisioning (DCP) (Meet the user’s 
perceived needs):  The mobile device can provide common 
functional capabilities. These capabilities would consist of 
applications the user expects and desires, with the capability of 
future growth. This growth could come from new functionality or 
new desires based on the changing needs and roles of the user. 
In essence, the mobile devices we describe here create an augmented 
reality where the user, the situation, user’s real environment, and data providers 
all exist and interact more seamlessly within a network. Thus the “mobile device,” 
although providing much of the functionality of any number of current computing 
devices, separates itself from these devices in the way it is “personal.”  The 
personalization of the device means it brings together a fusion of data as it 
relates to the individual. It also means there is an expectation of the device 
always being with the individual and always on or available in a networking 
sense. 
2. Use Case Examples from Functional Objectives 
Given the requirements listed above, we envision a number of future-
minded use cases that serve to demonstrate the new complexities associated 
with the information fusion inherent in today’s user-oriented, always available 
mobile devices. Although there are potentially an infinite number of use cases for 
these devices, we thought the following would provide good illustrations of the 
multiple-personality use of mobile devices:  
 Integrated Personal Calendar:  As the user rotates through 
different roles, or personalities, throughout their day the calendar 
would provide that personality’s corresponding schedule or 
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daybook. These integrated personal calendars could contain 
scheduling information for private, military, and maybe other roles 
such as a second job or membership in a professional organization.   
 Geo Tag Photographs:  The user shares photos with geo-location 
based on the context of the situation. For instance, on vacation the 
user may want to post photos of their hike through the Appalachian 
Trail for public consumption.   Upon deployment to the battlefield, 
that same user may want to distribute a geo tagged photograph 
identifying insurgents on the battlefield using an intelligence 
application.   
 Geo Location:  On the battlefield the user may want the capability 
to report Blue Force (i.e. Friendly force) Tracking information, send 
coordinates to a firebase, or generates intelligence information with 
geo-location information embedded. When returning home the user 
may want to provide family members their current location and 
estimated time of arrival. 
 Video Chat:  The user may want to visually communicate with his 
family, friends, or colleagues face to face either while deployed or 
simply away from home, or at home station. 
 Video Teleconference:  The user may need to participate in “face 
to face” meetings with coworkers who are geographically separate 
either while deployed or at home station. Much as it is depicted in 
the “Star Wars” episodes, video teleconferencing could be used to 
conduct military planning and coordination. 
 Email:  As the user rotates through different roles, or personalities, 
throughout their day the email inbox would provide that personalities 
corresponding digital communications. These integrated inboxes 
could contain digital communication for private, military, and maybe 
other roles such as a second job or membership in a professional 
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organization. This would include COI appropriate encryption and 
digital signing of digital communications. 
 On Demand Contextual Contacts:  The device would maintain 
contacts and display them within the correct context across all the 
user’s personalities. The user could use the device to remember 
co-worker names, birthdays, etc. Whereas on the battlefield the 
device could identify hostile insurgents, or even automatically report 
sightings of key enemy personnel when spotted.  
 Chat:  As the user rotates through different roles, or personalities, 
throughout their day the device would provide that personality the 
correct contacts with which to correspond digitally or chat. These 
chat sessions could occur with contacts that exist in private, 
military, and maybe other roles such as a second job or 
membership in a professional organization.  
 Share space:  The device should provide the user access to 
shared information stores for each of the user’s personalities. For 
example, the user may want to store information to Google Drive 
for personal storage and Microsoft SharePoint for work.   
 Real-time Intelligence:  The user receives information, alerts, and 
advisories, within context, across all personalities. For instance, the 
user could be alerted when friendly forces nearby engage hostile 
forces. Based on context, the mobile device could push intelligence 
information to the user on the locale, such as names of leadership, 
local laws, and customs when the user is approaching a remote 
village. At the office, the user could receive weather alerts, new 
policies, job postings, fire evacuation notices, or just the latest news 
headlines.  
 Automated Supply:  The user could explicitly or automatically, 
through the mobile device’s context awareness, request resupply or 
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materiel delivery on the battlefield for delivery. At home, the device 
could automatically order groceries or home supplies when it 
detects key items to be “low.” 
 Language Translation:  On vacation or during international 
meetings automatic translation by the mobile device could be very 
useful. While on the battlefield, the user could translate orders to or 
requests from the local populace to include analysis of sign 
language and facial expressions.  
 Command and Control:  At home station the user could receive 
the latest direction from leadership through notifications. The user 
could also contact coworkers, at any time, via a number of 
communication vehicles such as text, chat, email, social networks, 
blogs, or voice. In a battlefield situation, the user could send and 
receive information, such as orders, in the most appropriate vehicle 
given the context of the situation or ease of use. 
 Remote Health Tracking:  The COI could have the user wear, 
swallow, or embed a device that transmits personnel data that 
would not be available otherwise (such as Fitbit [9], M2A capsule, 
Metria [10]). This could allow remote diagnosis/physicals by 
doctors, along with constant remote tracking and follow-up. The 
kind of data that might be obtained is: the number pills taken, 
number of steps, heart rate, food eaten, body temperature, and 
sleep quality/quantity. 
 Distributed Sensory Data:  A COI could use a large deployment 
of mobile devices to collect sensory data to make decisions. 
Examples of this distributed network would be barometric data for 
weather forecasting, accelerometer data for earthquake predictions, 
or accelerometer data for troop or vehicle movements. When 
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combined with remote health tracking the heath of a corporation, 
army, or nation could be monitored.  
 Mesh Networking:  The user is able to connect to the network or 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) by allowing traffic to hop from 
mobile device to mobile device, with each mobile device essential 
action as a router. The user could even reach the required 
information or mobile device without ever reaching an external 
network or ISP.  “Many military systems rely on mesh networking, 
since forces in the field cannot rely on communications 
infrastructures. Utilities also use mesh networks for collecting data 
from equipment, like smart meters.” [11]   
The above list of uses cases does not detail every possible use for mobile 
devices by a given user. It does demonstrate that there are unique or enhanced 
functions enabled by mobile devices. In addition to these unique and enhanced 
functions, the user may also want to add-on functionality for personal use as new 
application become available. Therefore, we must provide integration among the 
multiple personalities based on the user’s community of interest. These unique 
use cases and integration among multiple personalities will be the focus of our 
analysis and process towards a mobile device security policy for the DoD. 
3. Threats and Security Context of Mobile Device Use Cases  
Many of the above listed use cases present additional security concerns 
unique to mobile devices. Unlike laptops, which are typically single purpose use 
and only used during specific times, mobile devices are personal communication 
and computing devices that are expected to be always on and always near the 
user. Further analyzing the use of a laptop versus a mobile device; typically, a 
user has a laptop issued from their workplace, this laptop is used for work during 
work times or the occasional home use when the need arises. However, at home 
they may also have a personal laptop. This personal laptop is used on personal 
time and only at home or other non-work locations. Note, one can replace 
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“laptop” with “desktop” but laptops serve the illustration better as they are 
intended to be more mobile. On the other hand, a mobile device is taken 
everywhere with the user and used at all times for many different purposes and 
roles. In essence, the device becomes an extension of the user, a surrogate of 
sorts for an individual who may maintain several different roles in their life.   
Using the device for different roles presents significantly complex and unique 
security concerns.  
The complexity of mobile device security for devices which support the 
above functionality and use cases grows as a result of the differences among 
COIs and even security requirements among content providers of each COI. 
Each COI will require an overarching security policy. For instance, a user who is 
an U.S. Air Force Reservist and a Department of Commerce (DOC) employee 
would have two COIs, one for each job, on his device. Each COI would have an 
overarching security policy and each security policy might differ in many ways, 
especially since the Air Force policy follows the Department of Defense 
Instruction (DoDI) 8500.2 [12] and the DOC policy follows NIST Special 
Publication (SP) 800.53 [13] implemented in the DOC information security 
policies. Additionally, within the COIs there may be content providers which 
implement more restrictive security policies than the overarching COI security 
policy. For instance, as a reservist the email content provider may implement a 
basic security policy whereas a content provider for military medical records 
would have to implement a more restrictive security policy based on Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA).   
To further demonstrate the need for a security policy that covers the 
complex security and privacy issues concerning mobile device, an illustration of a 
few examples and misuse cases have been listed below. The following is a list 
that exemplifies some of the security policy complexities: 
 User Calendar:  The user calendar is a clear case where the 
Confidentiality and Integrity of information is important in relation to 
the COIs. Information from all personalities should be capable of 
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being displayed in one calendar format for the user but in the case 
of a military COI the information would not necessarily be sharable 
with another COI. Additionally, all COIs would not want to allow 
another COI to alter information. For instance a personal Gmail 
calendar, although not as concerned about confidentiality, should 
not allow the military COI to alter the Gmail related calendar 
information, hence even the Gmail calendar expects a level of 
integrity. 
 Walk in the Woods:  The walk in the woods example 
demonstrates that the same functionality for different personalities 
requires different levels of information assurance. This example 
starts with a military user on leave walking through a national park. 
On his walk, he may want to use his Global Positioning System 
(GPS) for navigation while sharing his progress with photos to his 
friends and family on a popular social network. That same military 
user could be deployed a week later to an undisclosed forest. In 
that forest he would still want to use his GPS for navigation and 
possibly share photos of tactically or strategically important images. 
The difference would be that the military photographs should only 
be shared with his unit and not posted to a popular (or even 
unpopular) social network. This demonstrates that the same 
activates generating the same information may require different 
levels of protection based on context and personality. 
 Crashing a Video Party:  The crashing a video party demonstrates 
that the functionality offered by mobile devices should be equal 
across all personalities but separated. This example starts with a 
military user, on personal time off (PTO), hosting a video 
conference for a 10 year reunion. It is an open reunion party, so 
she wants to offer the capability for anyone to drop in and chat. To 
accommodate this functionality, the service (for example, Google 
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Chat) displays that she is in a video conference with the option for 
all contacts to join or drop in. After the reunion, she returns to work 
and is told to host a video conference for all colleagues on a new 
work policy. The same functionality must be offered, with the option 
to join, but she would not want to have the option available for a 
schoolmate to crash the work video conference. 
 Skyping from a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF):  This example demonstrates that not all functionality should 
be offered or available at all times. In this example, the user prefers 
to communicate with friends using Skype and would want it 
constantly available to him whenever on PTO. When working in a 
SCIF (in a future environment when mobile devices are allowed in 
SCIFs), the user would not want to have the capability to 
purposefully or accidently accept a Skype call from a personal 
contact. 
Along with examples are misuse cases, or example of security issues that 
could occur on mobile devices. The following is a list of misuse cases that 
exemplify some of the security policy complexities: 
 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) All Hands for a Harry Potter 
party:  This example demonstrates that the same command issued 
to a mobile device will have different meanings based on the 
context and personality. In this example, a CEO may want to let her 
entire personal address book know that she is hosting a Harry 
Potter party, because all of her friends are Harry Potter fans. To 
accomplish this at home, she tells her phone to email all her 
contacts that there is a Harry Potter costume party at her house on 
Friday. If the phone is not aware of the personality and context, 
then the CEO just invited the entire company over to her house 
where there will be a lot of colleagues dressed as Hermione and 
Weasley.   
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 Alerting Terrorists of U.S. Friendly Forces:  This example 
demonstrates the need to protect information presented by the 
mobile device even when physical control is lost. In this example, a 
military user has a mobile device that immediately alerts the user of 
local friendly forces and enemy personnel in the surrounding area. 
Unfortunately, the user loses their mobile device while on 
deployment in hostile territory. A local insurgent group finds the 
mobile device, but cannot unlock it to obtain the device’s data. They 
soon discover that even without unlocking it, they are notified of 
local friendly forces in the surrounding area. They are also able to 
obtain a list of individuals who have already been identified as 
hostile insurgents because of the alerts.   
 Uncontrolled Unclassified Information:  This example 
demonstrates that defaults for services on the mobile device need 
to be context and personality aware. When a military civilian 
receives his new phone, he automatically sets his default cloud 
storage for personal documents to Microsoft Skydrive. A few 
moments later, the users receives a work email with an attached 
Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) document. The user 
saves the document to default storage location, which is now 
Microsoft Skydrive without knowing it. The controlled information is 
now stored in an uncontrolled commercial service. 
 False Notifications:  This example demonstrates the need to 
protect against masquerading as another personality or cross 
another personalities boundary. In this example, the battlefield user 
downloads a game for personnel use. Unfortunately, the application 
was develop by unfriendly forces with the intent of providing false 
notifications to mislead the user in the battlefield. When the user 
passes by these unfriendly forces, it notifies the user that the 
unfriendly forces are actually friendly forces and notifies the user 
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that the friendly forces are unfriendly forces. This causes the user 
to ignore the unfriendly forces and attacked the friendly forces.   
 Free Wi-Fi on the Battlefield:  This example demonstrates that 
not all services should be allowed over all possible communication 
paths. The battlefield user could be offered an astonishing number 
of diverse services on the battlefield through mobile devices, like 
Blue Force and hostile insurgents tracking information. If the mobile 
device defaults to open Wi-Fi access, then all an insurgent would 
have to do is set up an open Wi-Fi access point and monitor all the 
data as it traverses the network giving the insurgents critical 
confidential information.  
 Passwords, there is an App for that:  This example demonstrates 
the need for enforcement of separation among personalities. The 
user of the mobile device would like to have a password 
management tool for their apps on the device, so they go out to the 
application store and download an app. The tool offers to 
remember all of their passwords and store them in the cloud for 
easy recovery. After downloading and installing the app, all the 
passwords for all personalities are now stored in one application’s 
cloud storage. 
 User Privacy:  This example demonstrates the need for private 
user data to be inaccessible by the employer. An employee, who is 
about to leave his second job, sends out his last email of the day on 
the mobile device provided by his primary employer. After clocking 
out, he opens up a few chat sessions, on that same mobile device, 
for his volunteer work with his religious leader and local political 
leader. Once completing this chat session, he drafts one more 
email to his therapist complaining about stress prior to retiring for 
the night. The next day, when he wakes up and returns to his 
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primary job he finds a termination notice on his desk. This is an 
extreme example, but there are many not so extreme examples of 
private data on social networks leading to such a termination. 
 A door to China:  All security starts at the hardware. If there is a 
backdoor manufactured into the hardware of the device, all the 
protection mechanisms at the hardware, software, and services 
levels will be for naught.  
 Silence is information:  This demonstrates the complexities of 
sensor information among personalities. In this example, two 
soldiers on the battlefield are about to go on a sensitive mission 
with their mobile devices. The first soldier, once deployed, has his 
GPS information provided to a blue force tracking application in his 
military personality collecting his location and labeling it as 
sensitive. This first soldier also has the “friend tracking service” 
application running and collecting the same information while 
broadcasting it to the Internet. In this example, the second soldier is 
also running the blue force tracking application, but turns off the 
“friend tracking service” application once stepping out on her 
mission. Unfortunately, the “friend tracking service” application still 
recorded the exact location right before turning off the service. On 
top of this, the silence of the application alerts the enemies that this 
second soldier may be performing a sensitive mission.  
These examples demonstrate the need for a security policy that covers 
the complex security and privacy issues concerning mobile devices.   
E. SUMMARY 
In this section, we have defined the unique aspects of mobile devices. 
Specifically, we identified mobile device as being more personal. This is made 
possible since the devices are always on, always on you, and environmentally 
context aware through their mobile sensors. From these unique aspects of 
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mobile devices, we identified possible use cases, along with the threats that 
these use cases present. As we move forward with confronting the security 
issues of today’s mobile devices and beyond, there will be questions about the 
security of mobile devices that will need to be addressed. These questions 
include: 
1) What is the effect to security policy?   
2) Are the security controls affected?   
3) How is security implementation affected? 
To start this effort, we will further refine and categorize our definition of 
mobile devices. We will then define a security policy in the perspective of this 
thesis along with currently applicable policies to mobile devices. From this 
analysis, we will demonstrate whether organizational policies will need to be 
modified to accommodate mobile devices. We will use all of this information, and 
our security policy development methodology, to determine approaches in 
defining an information flow with the goal of defining security ramifications and 
possible conflicts.   
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II. SECURITY POLICY FOR MOBILE DEVICES 
A. MOBILE DEVICES 
Before moving forward on a security policy, we must define the scope of 
mobile devices that will be covered in this thesis. In the next few sections we 
layout three different categories of mobile devices in the order of their evolution 
towards the ones that we see today (such as smartphones), and beyond. This 
evolution will start with Handheld Personal Computing Device (HPCD) and then 
progressively move towards a possible future of mobile devices that include 
“humanistic intelligence.”  We will then clarify the scope of this thesis based on 
this evolution. This scope will be tailored towards HPCDs while trying to 
accommodate “expandable sensors” and “wearable computing” which are 
detailed below. 
1. Handheld Personal Computing Devices  
Handheld Personal Computing Device (HPCD) is the first stage of the 
mobile evolution covered in this thesis. It is a category of mobile devices 
characterized by their size or “Hand-Held” status and wireless connectivity. This 
category of mobile devices usually includes the following minimum 
characteristics, as defined by NIST and PCMag: 
 Single Panel with Touch Screen or buttons 
 Portability. Portability creates the need for portable connectivity. It 
also creates the potential for the device to be present in 
environments not supportive of the data processed, stored, and 
transmitted. 
 An operating system optimized for mobility with a single user. OS 
Security primarily provides protection for the commercial service 
provider.  
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 At least one wireless/wired network interface for Internet access 
(data communications). This interface could use Wi-Fi, cellular 
networking, Bluetooth, WiMax, Near Field Communications (NFC), 
USB, or other technologies that connect the mobile device to 
network infrastructures with Internet connectivity. 
 Local built-in (non-removable) data storage 
 Built-in features for synchronizing local data with a remote location 
(desktop or laptop computer, organization servers, 
telecommunications provider servers, other third party servers, etc.)  
 From this minimum set of characteristics, HPCDs can be further 
reduced into two categories:  fixed function or general purpose.   
Fixed function or single purpose HPCDs were the first generation of 
mobile devices to market, and still flourish today. These devices perform one 
specific application well. As such, these devices only have the wireless protocols, 
applications, and sensors needed to perform that single application or function. 
Examples of these devices would be the Amazon Kindle Paperwhite (eReaders), 
Garmin handheld Global Positioning Systems (GPSs), handheld video phones, 
and portable media players. These devices cannot perform all the functions of a 
general purpose HPCDs, but they can usually perform their one specific 
application reliably.  
The second category, general purpose HPCDs, are designed to be a 
platform for multiple applications. They are designed to be expandable beyond 
the default applications that reside on the device at the time of purchase. 
Examples include iPod, iPhone, iPad, Android Devices, and Microsoft Surface. 
As such, they usually have the following additional minimum characteristics: 
 At least one wireless interface (such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC), 
sensors (camera, microphone, GPS, barometer, accelerometer) 
that provide data about its surroundings, and actuators (e.g., 
speaker) that would not be available otherwise. 
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 Applications available through multiple methods that expand the 
device beyond its originally provided applications 
It was the creation of these general purpose HPCDs that revolutionized 
the commercial marketplace. It allowed for the ability to create and easily 
distribute a single purpose application (such as GPS or e-reader) on a general 
purpose HPCD (such as smartphone or tablet) through an application 
marketplace onto a device already owned by the user. This is accomplished at a 
fraction of the cost of a single purpose HPCD by using functionality and 
embedded sensors already provided by the device.   These applications harvest 
data from available embedded sensors on the mobile device, such as GPS for 
mapping jogging routes. These applications eventually evolved to interface with 
external devices, beyond the ones built into the mobile device (e.g., sensors). 
These additional sensors are used to collect more information about the device’s 
soundings. This in turn broadens functionality beyond what the mobile device 
could initially provide at purchase. An application marketplace and integrated 
sensors distinguish a general purpose HPCD.  
It is important to have a basic understanding of these topics: 
a. Application Marketplace  
The application marketplace provides access to addition software 
applications to expand the functionality of the device.   It is usually a service 
provided by the Operating System (OS) developer or device manufacture that 
has the capability of presenting applications available for the user to install.   In 
doing so, “The application market place function combines the traditional roles of 
content aggregator and distributor. The store constitutes a direct link between 
developers and consumers, significantly reducing the barriers between them, as 
both interact directly with it” [14].    
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b. Embedded and Expandable Sensors 
As stated earlier, mobile device applications are increasing their 
functionality by using sensors connected to the device. This connection is 
accomplished through sensors that are either embedded (such as GPS, camera, 
accelerometer),  wireless (such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC ) or via some external 
interface, for example a dock. Examples of such applications using these 
sensors include Square’s mobile payment [15] (docked connection) and QR 
codes (data  sensed through embedded camera). There are many drivers for this 
expansion of the kinds of sensors and their use, but “one of the biggest drivers … 
is the increasing number of low-cost sensors available for many different kinds of 
functionality” [16]. “Some of the standard sensors include movement (via 
accelerometer), sound, light, [user input or relative position] (via potentiometer), 
temperature, moisture, location (via GPS), heart rate and heart rate variability, 
and GSR (galvanic skin response or skin conductivity)” [16].  “Many devices have 
been attached to smartphones for novel applications.. such as AliveCor’s 
electrocardiogram (ECG) recorder for heart monitoring, MobiSante’s 
smartphone-based ultrasound imaging system, and the CellScope. The 
CellScope has a series of clip-on modules for the smartphone such as an 
otoscope (to look into the middle ear), and a dermascope (to capture magnified 
images of the skin)” [16].   All of these applications using these embedded and 
expandable sensors are leading to the next generation of mobile computing. 
 The next generation [of mobile computing]… is visible in 
product announcements, many of which fall into the category of 
wearable electronics and/or multi-sensor platforms. These products 
include smartwatches, wristband sensors, wearable sensor 
patches, artificial reality-augmented glasses, brain computer 
interfaces, wearable body metric textiles (such as Hexoskin to track 
athletes performance). [16]  
2.  Wearable Computing 
Wearable computing is a next logical step and extension from HPCDs. “An 
important distinction between wearable computers and ...handheld computers… 
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is that the goal of wearable computing is to position or contextualize the 
computer in such a way that the human and computer are inextricably 
intertwined” [17]. Currently there are three wearable computing categories 
available or publicized as being under development. These categories are 
augmented reality, wearable human sensors, and smart clothing. 
As documented in Microsoft’s patent filling, the augmented reality display 
“is a system and method to present a user... with supplemental information when 
viewing a live event. A user... views the live event while simultaneously receiving 
information on objects, including people, within the user’s field of view... The 
information is presented in a position in the.. display which does not interfere with 
the user’s enjoyment of the live event” [18].  They are devices that “let you show 
and interact with the world around you without disconnecting from it” [19].   
Another example of the functionality provided by such augmented reality devices 
was documented in Time magazine. The commented about Google Glass that, 
“Users will be able to take and share photos, video-chat, check appointments 
and access maps and the Web” [20].   A potential example of map notifications is 
demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Example Notification from Google Glass. From [21] 
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“The see-through lens could display everything from text messages to 
maps to reminders. They may be capable of showing video chats, providing turn-
by-turn directions, taking photos and recording notes—all through simple voice 
commands” [22].  A potential example of Turn-by-Turn direction functionality is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Example Turn-by-Turn directions. From [23] 
These glasses could eventually evolve into a contact lens that is placed into the 
eye directly, therefore alleviating the need for headwear. In fact, “The Centre of 
Microsystems Technology (CMST) has developed an innovative spherical curved 
[Liquid Crystal Display (LCD)] display, which can be embedded in contact lenses. 
In the future, the display could also function as a head-up display, superimposing 
an image onto the user’s normal view” [24] .   
  “Another new product category that could quickly become commonplace is 
wearable sensors, low-cost disposable patches that are worn continuously for 
days at a time and then discarded. It is estimated that 80 million wearable 
sensors will be in use for health-related applications by 2017, an eight-fold 
increase over today” [13]. “The concept is not new, nicotine patches for smoking 
cessation are a familiar concept, but the extended on-board sensor functionality 
is an important innovation. The next generation of patches moves away from 
standard transdermal passive diffusion technology, and instead uses rich sensor 
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technology to enable patches to transmit information wirelessly, and possibly 
engage in two-way communication for real-time adjustments. One of the potential 
developments in wearable patches is Sano Intelligence’s continuous blood 
chemistry monitoring patches. The disposable patch (one-week use) has been 
demonstrated to measure blood glucose and potassium levels, and aims to 
measure a full metabolic panel, including kidney function and electrolyte balance. 
Further, there are enough probes on the wireless, battery-powered chip to 
continuously test up to a hundred different samples” [14]. Other examples of 
wearable sensors include Scandu SCOUT [25] (medical biometric), Fitbit [9] 
(wireless health tracker), M2A capsule (wireless endoscopy pill), and Metria [10] 
(remote medical monitoring system). Notice that many of these uses are based 
on health monitoring and have privacy information consequences, this will be 
important as we move forward with the security policy for mobile devices. 
 The final wearable computing item to be discussed in this document is 
“smart clothing.”  Examples of such items include the Army’s Antenna Clothing 
which “could reduce the burden and the danger for military radiomen” [26] and 
nike+ running shoes for tracking fitness. There is also “a new product category, 
the smartwatch, which is effectively a wearable connected computer. This new 
generation of programmable watches includes the Pebble watch, the Basis 
watch, the Contour Watch from Wimm Labs, and the Sony SmartWatch” [16].  As 
these wearable computers are integrated into our everyday life, slowly the human 
and machine begin to intertwine leading to humanistic intelligence. 
3. Humanistic Intelligence–Embedded Technology 
“One of the main features of humanistic intelligence is constancy of 
interaction, that the human and computer are inextricably intertwined. This arises 
from constancy of interaction between the human and computer, i.e., there is no 
need to turn the device on prior to engaging it (thus, serendipity)” [17].  “Another 
feature of humanistic intelligence is the ability to multi-task. It is not necessary for 
a person to stop what they are doing to use a wearable computer because it is 
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always running in the background, so as to augment or mediate the human’s 
interactions. Wearable computers can be incorporated by the user to act like a 
prosthetic, thus forming a true extension of the user’s mind and body” [17]. 
All three different categories of mobile devices listed above have their own 
particular security requirements and concerns. In order to move forward, we will 
focus our scope on the kind of mobile device we will be discussing for the 
remainder of this document. Our scope will be tailored towards HPCDs while 
trying to accommodate “expandable sensors” and “wearable computing.”  With 
the scope of mobile devices decided, we will need to define and scope a security 
policy. 
B. WHAT IS A “SECURITY POLICY” 
1. Defining “Security Policy”  
In his book, Computer Security Art and Science, Matt Bishop describes a 
security policy as, “a statement of what is, and what is not, allowed” [27].  In the 
field of Computer Science, the term “security policy” is well used. The issue with 
“security policy” is it has many different meanings depending on the context. The 
online Webster’s dictionary defines “Security” as the quality or state of being 
secure. Their second definition of the word “Secure” is free from danger, free 
from risk of loss, affording safety, and/or trustworthy and dependable. Therefore, 
one can deduce a security policy to be:  A policy which, if followed, would keep 
the object of the policy in a quality or state of being secure, which is to say it 
would be kept free from danger, loss, kept safe, and is considered trustworthy 
and dependable. In the case of an information security policy, we assert the 
object is information. Finally, one could compare the concept of being “free from 
danger and loss” to the idea of maintaining confidentiality. “Safety and 
trustworthiness” could describe Integrity. Finally, “dependable” could describe 
Availability.   
In the DoD there are many contexts for security policies. Two such 
contexts would be physical security and information security policies. What is 
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interesting is the two overlap in requirements. For instance, physical security and 
information security although seemingly very distinct, are, in fact, symbiotic in 
their relationship. One can imagine that without good physical security, 
information would be easy to obtain by simply taking the physical devices on 
which the information is stored. In reverse, good physical security would be 
severely compromised if the enemy had access to our information. Imagine what 
would happen if the security guard’s relief schedules, building drawings, or 
distress code words were known to the enemy. In this case, the insecurity of 
information would compromise our physical security. Although a coordinated and 
comprehensive security policy is required at the DoD level, this paper will focus 
on security policy from the context of information security. Although, as noted, 
information security must identify physical security requirements as they relate to 
the protection of information.   
2. Information as the Transactional Entity  
If we apply Bishop’s definition to information security we have a good 
abstract concept for a DoD information security policy, however, we still fail to 
link this concept to the overall purpose. For illustration, we suggest there exist 
four primary categories for Information Security implementers: government 
organizations, commercial organizations, private organizations, and individuals. 
The specific purpose and intent of a given information security policy comes from 
the specific needs of an organization or individual. Table 1 outlines a partial list of 
motivations for employing a security policy for each category of beneficiaries: 
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      * denotes the primary resource 
Table 1. Purpose of a Security Policy 
The main purpose of an information security policy depends on the data 
owner (or stakeholders) but it revolves around information, just different 
categories of information. A Government organization, such as the DoD, is 
primarily concerned with national security, and thereby must protect national 
security information. More specifically our nation has become aware of the 
requirement for cybersecurity [28], where information is considered a vital 
resource that requires protection and availability. Commercial organizations have 
requirements to meet certain laws, but most importantly, their requirements 
derive from the need to profit. Therefore, commercial organizations are 
concerned mostly with the integrity of their financial information or information 
related to the financial health of the company. Individuals on the other hand are 
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primarily concerned with privacy in order to protect themselves, their family, their 
belongings, and their financial well-being. Confidentiality of personally identifiable 
information (PII) is key to an individual’s ability to that protection. Non-
commercial organizations have many of the same concerns as commercial 
organizations and individuals combined. They do not have profit but they do 
typically have an operating budget that is essential to meeting the goals of the 
organization.   Stated another way, both individuals and groups of individuals 
(organizations) have implied or stated missions. For individuals, their mission is 
life and the pursuit of happiness. Organizations have specific missions that 
further their member’s individual missions. In some cases, the missions involve 
acquiring money that can be exchanged for supporting life and pursuing 
happiness. Both individuals and organizations need sufficient privacy/secrecy for 
mission accomplishment. The common element is information. 
We assert the central purpose of an information security policy is to define 
where information is allowed and not allowed to flow, where information must be 
allowed to flow, and who or what can and cannot create or edit information. It 
would help to think of information as what we will call the transactional entity. As 
noted in the previous paragraph, information is the central element in all cases. 
Therefore, information is in fact what we wish to guarantee and control in order to 
meet the purpose and intent of the organization and individual. We can 
guarantee the flow of information and control the flow of information by 
developing an information-flow centric information security policy. A policy 
describes where information flow is allowed and disallowed and where 
information must be guaranteed to flow. In this manner, we will say information-
flow is the vehicle through which we will meet our organization or individual 
objectives.   
3. Security  Objectives and Resources 
We believe the need for an information flow is derived from objectives an 
individual or an organization is trying to achieve.   Controlling and assuring the 
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flow of information or enforcing an information-flow policy without clear objectives 
could be wasteful. In the case of a commercial organization, for instance, being 
too wasteful in security could produce the opposite result of the purpose to 
produce profit by needlessly increasing cost. For government organizations, 
there is also a concern for cost, but there may also be a negative effect on the 
mission when information essential to the success of a mission may not be 
readily available to the mission planners or executers because of an overly 
restrictive information-flow. On the other hand, information flow enforcement 
must meet all the intended purposes in order to protect the person or 
organization. Therefore, the information-flow should be tied to the purpose via 
the use of policy objectives. These objectives must clearly identify how they (the 
policies) meet the intent of the organizational or individual purpose. This 
construct, built with objectives, will link our information flow to our purpose to 
create a comprehensive information security policy that matches the overall 
intent and nothing more. 
Daniel Sterne, who noted the multiplicity in the common meaning of the 
term “Security Policy” sought to define new terms with which we could more 
precisely discuss security. In his paper, On the buzzword “Security Policy,” he 
attempted to bridge the gap of all security policies by defining the term “Security 
Policy Objective.”   In the security policy objective, the data owner defines the 
intent to protect an identified resource from unauthorized use. He also states the 
resource must have some form that is tangible. Overall, the security policy object 
is a description of the kinds of uses that are to be regulated. This is Sterne’s 
description of the abstract policy, which describes a statement of intent [29]. 
However, it is too narrow in that it does not address guaranteed levels of service. 
We will also more clearly define “tangible” resources and the objectives for our 
definition of a security policy. 
Resources can be divided abstractly into five main categories: people, 
equipment, material, financial implements, and information. These resources 
could be physical, such as raw material, or abstract such as money or company 
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stocks. It is important to consider information as an independent resource. For 
instance, in the world of Psychological Operations (Psyop) where, from a security 
perspective, it is very important to maintain positive influence on one’s own 
troops, a person’s feelings would not be tangible or stored in an IT device and yet 
a PSYOP operator must implement ways to protect friendly forces from being 
swayed by enemy Psychological attacks. In another example, intelligence 
information is not always manifested in an IT device. As a first hand witness, one 
could pass on sensitive information verbally to another person. This passing of 
information should be disallowed by policy. So one may protect other resources 
by controlling the flow of information but information is also the object of 
protection as a resource in itself. 
Objectives also have three main categories that are well defined as the 
CIA information security triad: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. We 
assert, that in relation to a particular resource, an information security policy 
statement should include an objective which defines how we are keeping 
information confidential, maintaining its integrity, and/or guaranteeing a level of 
service (availability). 
4. Defining “Information Security Policy”  
In our understanding of a security policy consider a combination of both 
Bishop’s and Sterne’s explanation. We will modify Sterne’s security policy 
objective to mean a single statement of a particular allowed or disallowed 
interaction between subjects and objects. Both subjects and objects can be 
tangible or intangible. Subjects can also be objects and vice versa. This way we 
incorporate the simplicity of Bishop’s definition of what is allowed and disallowed 
and we add more specificity as to what we are protecting as is suggested in 
Sterne’s paper. 
However, this definition fails to link the “what” to the “why.”  The “why” is 
the intent, or as Sterne might say, the objective. Additionally, the term 
“interaction” as it relates to information is too ambiguous. Within the intended 
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policy, information can be used many times but not be revealed.   For example, 
information about DoD intelligence can often be known and acted on, but the 
intelligence itself may not be provided to other individuals. Further complicating 
the issue, information when acted on may also compromise the intelligence that 
spurred it and thereby reveal the information. In this case, the security policy may 
need to describe uses of knowledge gained from intelligence information. What is 
common in both these examples is the flow of information.   
A more accurate definition of an information security policy was provided 
by Dr. Dinolt, “[An Information security policy] is a verbal description of allowed 
and/or disallowed information flow, it may be mandatory or discretionary access 
control, it may be for information privacy and/or integrity, and may provide 
provision of service guarantees” [30]. Adding the “how,” we define an information 
security policy statement as, “A verbal description of mandatory or discretionary 
access control to define allowed, disallowed information flow, and/or service 
guarantees for the purpose of protecting an identified resource.   
There are three main components of an information security policy 
statement. These characteristics are instantiated in the policy. The first 
component is the access control in terms of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
and Discretionary Access Control (DAC). The second component is the 
objective(s) in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability as discussed 
previously. The third component is the resource(s) intended to be protected by 
the policy statement. An information security policy statement would not be 
complete if it did not describe all three components. An information security 
policy is a collection of security policy statements. A collection of all information 
security polices for a given organization are what we will call Organization 
Security Policy (OSP). It might be useful to follow some sort of thought process in 
order to fill out all the required objectives. A typical process is: 
1) Identify and categorize your resources. 
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2) Identify which resources require protection and how in terms of CIA 
objectives. 
3) What behavior must be imposed in order to meet the CIA objectives 
to be satisfied? 
Figure 3 shows an abstract construction of an information security policy 
statement, security policies and organizational security policies. 
 
Figure 3.  Information Security Policy Statement 
A complete security policy statement requires all components be clearly 
defined in prose and can be written in any order. In an example, an information 
security policy statement may be, “National Security information shall be 
protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification by restricting access to 
only those with the appropriate security clearance, a signed non-disclosure 
agreement, and demonstrated need-to know.”  This statement, modified from the 
Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 8500.01E [31], contains all the required 
components of an information security policy statement. The access control is 
MAC with DAC tacked on top as personnel are given access only after they meet 
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certain published criteria such as obtaining the appropriate clearance but are 
further restricted by a “demonstrated need-to know” which is determined by the 
person who is providing access to the information, but is not specific to the type 
or label of the information. The resource is “National Security Information,” and 
the objective is to maintain the confidentiality and Integrity of National Security 
Information. Of course, “National Security Information” and “appropriate security 
clearance” must and would be defined. The most important aspect is ensuring 
the information security policy includes the three basic elements, in any order, 
without providing the “how,” more than is needed to understand the access 
control. To this point, too much information is unwanted at this level. For 
instance, if the statement had included a requirement for encryption, as is found 
in the DoDD 8500 series, this would be too specific, it would be the “how.”  A 
requirement such as encryption is a specific implementation, which is better 
defined at a level of implementation closer to the specific device. Therefore, 
information security policies are “supported” by implementations. In the DoD 
these lower levels are in general the Security Technical Implementation Guide 
(STIGs) and their corresponding automated benchmarks [32]. The other federal 
construct is the NIST SP 800.53 controls and the Security Baseline Configuration 
Guides, some of which are defined with government-wide configuration guides 
such as the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB), 
formally Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC).   
C. SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY 
1. Security Policy Levels and Examples 
In the previous section, we draw on Daniel Sterne’s terminology for the 
“Organization Security Policy (OSP)” and “Security Policy Objective.”  Except 
Sterne describes an OSP broadly, where the concept bridges policy with 
elements of implementation. Specifically in Sterne’s paper, there is no clear 
concept of security controls. We choose to add in security controls in order to 
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describe, in more detail, how one must implement the OSP. In doing so we use 
the NIST SP 800.53 terminology. Figure 4 describes our concept. 
 
Figure 4.  Information Security Requirements Hiearchy 
The security policy objectives give us our intent, which is defined within 
the OSP as described in the previous section. The security controls provide how 
the OSP is satisfied, which must then be specifically translated into the technical 
requirements and operation procedures for both specific information systems and 
situations (Table 2). 
We differ from NIST in that we believe management controls overlap and 
are consumed by the OSP. In the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF), 
security controls seem take on an all-encompassing role in not only driving 
downward to device specific implementation but driving upward to policy 






















Table 2. NIST Security Controls. From  [13] 
 First, one might think the management controls contain all the policy 
requirements. In fact, management controls provide for the management 
functions of the risk management framework for the organization. Second, every 
control family starts with a requirement to have policies and procedures 
addressing that family of controls. We believe this organization causes a bit of 
confusion. In practice, there becomes an overly complicated and circular 
relationship between controls and organizational policy that then includes higher 
level policies. It is unclear whether an organization must produce policy at their 
level or if they can assume the policy of a higher organization. The usual result 
within federal agencies is a whole policy set at each major organizational level 
that simply regurgitates the NIST SP 800.53 revision 3 controls.    
Therefore, we choose to remove management as a class of security 
controls. Which is what appears to be taking place in the revision 4 of the SP 
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800–53 [33] document currently in draft as the document makes no reference to 
the class of the control. In the modification we propose, we assume the NIST 
management class would be assumed within both the operational and technical 
controls, not just simply disregarded. Additionally, we believe each security 
control should be clear in its intent. There should be an automated or procedural 
implementation. Operational controls should be procedural whereas the technical 
controls should be implemented automatically by the given information system or 
collection of systems. That is not to say an operational control could not 
compensate for the lack of a device’s ability to implement a technical control. 
However, it should be noted that the technical control was not implemented 
rather than considered satisfied by the procedure. This distinction will help in 
determining the exact nature of an information system’s ability to implement the 
OSP. Finally, it is assumed that it is in place to support a security control and 
therefor this circular reference should be removed from the controls. In our 
approach, we assume that if there is no policy-objective statement that requires 
the use of a particular control then it is in fact not required. 
 Sterne does very well to define technical controls. Automated Security 
Policies (ASP) as he described are automated implementation of the OSP. 
However, he fails to clearly address any concept for what we would call 
operational controls. Believing the procedural element of information security is 
as important, if not more, than the automated controls, we choose to define our 
security control layer in two classes: operational and technical. At the device 
specific implementation level we translate operational controls to procedures that 
are implemented by humans, and technical controls which are implemented as 
benchmarks on computers. We borrow the term benchmark from the Defense 
Information Systems Agency’s (DISA’s) automated portion of technical 
specifications (e.g., STIGs) in compliance with NIST Security Content 
Automation Protocol (SCAP) specifications [32]. SCAP is a suite of specifications 
that standardize the format and nomenclature by which security software 
products communicate software flaw and security configuration information [34].     
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Considering our modification of Sterne’s definitions and NIST’s security 
control construct, we have now defined the following information security 
construct (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  Information Security Construct 
Our information security framework is divided into three main levels:   
 Organizational Security Policies (OSP), which collectively 
describe the information-flow policy 
 Security Controls, which provide the how 
 System Specific Implementation, which fills in the details for a 
given information system or logically grouped collection of systems 
In our framework we create organizational security policies with 
information security policy objective statements. Security control baselines are 
developed based on the security policy objectives and mapped to the objective 
statements in order to ensure complete coverage. In turn, at the information 
system level the device benchmarks map to the technical controls and 
procedures map to the operation controls. In this way, one can ensure there is 
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complete coverage of all controls by the system specific implementation and 
there is complete coverage of the OSP by security controls. In other words, every 
system specific implementation can be mapped to the specific security policy 
objective statements it supports and each security policy objective statement can 
be linked to the resulting device specific implementations. This allows one to 
show complete coverage of the OSPs and complete requirements traceability. 
Starting with our previous security policy objective example, a mapping 
would look like the Figure 6. Of course, this example does not include all 





Figure 6.  Example Information Security Construct Requirements Traceability 
In Figure 6, we show how a security policy objective should be mapped to 
specific implementations. In this example the implementation are generalized, 
but in practice they would be very specific. For instance, instead of the 
benchmark being “Specific Group Policy Implementations” the benchmark would 
be all the specific settings for the given device as identified in the Baseline 
Security Configuration Guide. In DoD, these guides are the STIGs and the SCAP 
benchmarks. An example of a specific setting would be:  set “Accounts: Guest 
Account Status” to “Disabled.”  There is a large number of these settings that are 
required, many of which may map to multiple controls. Also, in our example we 
show the control AC-2 as bridging the operational and technical controls. This is 
because at the sub-control level this control had elements of both. There is an 
initial and continuous process for approving accounts and there are sub-controls 
that require automated management such as automated disabling of accounts 
that remain dormant for a given period of time. In the case of a windows domain, 
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the automated disabling of a dormant account is a specific setting on the domain 
controller. Therefore, this sub-control translates to benchmarks. Although the 
example is generalized at the control level to save space, in practice a sub-
control should be clearly intended for either procedural or benchmark 
implementation. There may also be cases where a system cannot implement 
certain technical controls either wholly or partially. In those cases it must be 
determined if an operational control and/or procedure can compensate for the 
lack of functionality. Otherwise, the system will not be able to meet the driving 
information security objective. 
Ultimately, the goal is to meet all the information security policy objectives. 
To do so we must be able to determine what requirements an information system 
must meet. Therefore, we must be able derive specific security implementations 
from the information security policy objectives. Our construct is an attempt to 
clarify this relationship and provide a 3-level framework for determining systems 
specific requirements. However, in the details of developing system specific 
requirements, we believe one must follow an engineering process.  
2. Engineering Process 
In order to develop a security policy, engineering processes must be 
selected. The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF), diagramed below, is 
the one we chose since a majority of this thesis is based on their document. The 
RMF consists of six steps to be followed throughout an information system’s life 
cycle. Since we are focusing on the creation and implementation of a security 
policy for mobile devices, we will focus the Categorize step through the 





Figure 7.  Engineering Process in the NIST RMF 
Prior to the Categorize step of the RMF being executed, preparation must 
take place and requirement analysis performed. This preparation begins with the 
collection and consideration of architecture descriptions and organizational 
inputs. The organizational inputs that should be consider include [35] :  
 Laws, Directives, and Policy Guidance 
 Strategic Goals 
 Objectives and Priorities 
 Resource Availability 
  Supply Chain Considerations 
The architecture descriptions that should be considered include [35]:  
 Architecture Reference Models 
 Segment/Solution Architectures 
 
Engineering Process  
 47
 Mission/Business Processes 
 Information System Boundaries 
These inputs are utilized to perform requirements analysis. Requirements 
analysis would include identifying the needs of the organization (what the product 
must do) and the security requirements for the product (e.g., relevant security 
policies) [36]. The end user’s requirements, such as remote access for 
telecommuters or a web server to make internal information available to 
employees are identified upfront in the requirements analysis. The results of 
preparation should be documented in for inclusion of Categorize step of the 
RMF. 
The Categorize step of the RMF is performed after the architecture 
descriptions, organizational inputs, and requirements are defined. This step 
starts with identifying all the information types for the system. This involves 
identifying all of the applicable information types that are representative of data 
input, stored, processed, and/or output from each system [37]. These information 
types are then used to establish provisional impact levels based on Federal 
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199 [38] categorization criteria. The 
provisional impact levels are then reviewed and adjusted based on the security 
objectives of each information type. After the review is completed, the process 
described in FIPS 199 is used to determine the system security categorization 
level (low, moderate, or high) which is used for selecting the security control 




Figure 8.  SP 800–60 Security Categorization Process Execution. From [37] 
In the next step of the RMF, Select, we select an initial set of baseline 
security controls for the information system in accordance with FIPS 200 [39] and 
NIST SP 800–53. The derived impact level (low, moderate, or high) obtained 
from the Categorize step, is used to select the appropriately tailored set of 
baseline security controls in NIST SP 800–53 [13]. After selecting the initial set of 
baseline security controls, they are then tailored to more closely align with the 
specific conditions within the organization [40]. Finally, a risk assessment is 
performed against the tailored security controls to determine if additional 
supplementary controls are required to mitigate unacceptable risk. During this 
stage, threats to the information system are identified. A threat is the potential for 
a particular threat-source to successfully exercise a particular vulnerability. A 
vulnerability is a weakness that can be accidentally triggered or intentionally 
exploited. The goal of this stage is to identify potential threat-sources that are 
applicable to the information system being considered, as well as the 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the potential threat-sources [36]. In 
many cases, additional security controls or control enhancements will be needed 




Figure 9.  Security Control Selection Process. From [13]  
In the Implement step of the RMF, we implement the security controls and 
document how the controls are deployed within the information system and 
environment of operation [40].   It is important to note that this step of the process 
is currently being updated by NIST in SP 800–160, but for now we will use SP 
800–70 for this stage. During this stage, security controls targeted for 
deployment within the information system are allocated to specific system 
components responsible for providing a particular security capability [35]. In this 
step it is necessary to ensure that the security controls selected are appropriate; 
that is, that they implement an appropriate security solution and still allow the 
system to meet its requirements for functionality [36]. Once deemed appropriate, 
security controls are deployed or implemented within the information system and 
appropriately documented. In addition to deploying the selected security controls, 
organizations ensure that mandatory configuration settings are established and 
implemented on information technology products in accordance with federal and 




Figure 10.  Checklist User Process Overview. From [36]  
During this processes the mandatory configuration settings, or checklists, 
are also used to analyze the impact on an organization’s current policies and 
practices (e.g., having JavaScript disabled in a browser might make some web 
pages unusable). An organization may determine that some aspects of the 
checklist do not conform to certain organization-specific security and operational 
needs and requirements. Organizations should carefully evaluate the checklist 
settings and give them considerable weight, then make any changes necessary 
to adapt the settings to the organization’s environment, requirements, policies, 
and security objectives. All deviations from the settings in the checklist should be 
documented for future reference.” [36]  After the completion of this step, a system 
with all corresponding documentation should be available for the Assess step, 
which is not covered in this document (NIST SP 800–53A). This completes the 
engineering process in the NIST RMF, as we progress towards developing a 
security policy for mobile devices. 
Above, we have defined a security policy, security controls and the 
engineering processes. Using this framework we start developing a security 
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policy for mobile devices, or specifically what unique security requirements exist 
for mobile devices. The strategic goals, objective, and priorities for a mobile 
device have already been listed earlier in this document. So now we must move 
onto the strategic goal for a DoD security policy, prior to collecting all applicable 
laws, directives, and policy guidance. 
D. DOD SECURITY POLICIES 
1. Department of Defense (DoD) Security Policy 
The DoD security policies primarily address the confidentiality of national 
security information. Specifically, the main focus of DoD information security 
policy is the classified National Security Information (NSI) which is categorized 
into three different hierarchical levels of classifications. The levels, in order of 
increasing information sensitivity, are Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. [41]  
The lowest level is unclassified, the highest level being Top Secret. The 
information sensitivity level below the classified levels is Unclassified. In this 
structure, information may flow up from all levels to the levels above, but 
information may not flow down [42]. In this way, the DoD is essentially a 
confidentiality model implementing Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and is well 
modeled by the Bell/LaPadula security model.      
However, the vast majority of DoD business is conducted in the 
unclassified domain and much of this information must also be protected. The 
unclassified domain of information is one of the areas we are examining for 
processing on mobile devices. The protection of unclassified information is 
governed by a simple policy, which makes the distinction among Controlled 
Unclassified Information (CUI) information and other minor forms of unclassified 
information. CUI is defined in the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 
5200.01 as follows: 
A categorical designation that refers to unclassified information that 
does not meet the standards for National Security Classification 
under Reference (e), but is pertinent to the national interests of the 
United States or to the important interests of entities outside the 
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Federal Government and under law or policy requires protection 
from unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or  
prescribed limits on exchange or dissemination. [43] 
This is information such as privacy information, health information, 
proprietary information, and any information, determined to be sensitive in nature 
such as information, which, if observed by the enemy, would jeopardize 
Operations Security (OPSEC) of a given mission.  
The information flow for unclassified information is fairly simple. 
Unclassified information may not flow to the public domain with the only 
exception being once it is deemed officially releasable by Public Affairs. CUI is 
additionally restricted to only being releasable on a “need to know” basis. This 
means CUI must be properly labeled and additional access controls must be 
used which ensure it is only accessible to those with a “need to know” the 
information. Therefore, unclassified information and specifically CUI is governed 
by a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) as the release of this information is left 
to the judgment of individual entities who are responsible for controlling the 
release of the information to those who are authorized to have the information, 
basing the decision on “need to know” rather than assigned security labels. 
For a DoD policy, attention must also be paid to the integrity and 
availability of the information system and its data. The integrity portion of the 
security policy “will need to assure the accuracy and reliability of the information 
and device, and prevent any unauthorized modifications” [44].  The goal of the 
integrity portion of the security policy is to protect the high integrity system 
functions, device applications, and data from the lower integrity applications, 
code, and data.   While the goal of the availability portion of the security policy 
will be to ensure “reliable and timely access to data and resources to authorized 
individuals and applications” [44]. The levels of integrity and availability for 
information stored by the device are as defined by FIPS 199, discussed earlier in 
this document.   These levels from FIPS 199 will lead to the security controls 
selected to assure integrity and availability of the system.   
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2. Executive, Federal, and Defense Organizational Policy 
 The goal of this section is to begin our security policy objects review with 
organizational policies. A higher-level organizational policy specifies what is to be 
achieved by proper design and use of a computing system. For this document, 
the organizational policies will come from existing Executive, Federal, and 
Department of Defense (DoD) Information Assurance (IA) policies. From this 
collection of policies, we will select a subset based on their applicability to the 
unique aspects of mobile devices. This selection process will include analysis of 
these existing policies to determine if they require modification to accommodate 
mobile devices. The initial list of policies analyzed based on potential content 
unique to mobile devices is as follows: 
  ASD(NII)/DoD CIO Memo DoD guidance on protecting personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) [45] 
 ASN(NII)/DoD CIO Memo Protection of Sensitive DoD Data at Rest 
on Portable Computing Devices [46] 
 CNSSAM IA 1–10 Reducing Risk of Removable Media in National 
Security Systems (NSS) [47] 
 CNSSI-1253 Security Categorization and Control Selection for 
National Security [48] 
 CNSSI-4007 Communications Security (COMSEC) Utility Program 
[49] 
 CNSSI-5000 Guidelines for VOIP Computer Telephony [50] 
 CNSSI-5002 National Information Assurance Instruction for 
Computerized Telephone Systems [51] 
 CNSSP-1 National Policy for Safeguarding and Control of 
COMSEC Material [52] 
 CNSSP-14 National Policy Governing the Release of IA 
Products/Services [53] 
 CNSSP-17 National Information Assurance Policy on Wireless 
Capabilities [54] 
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 CNSSP-25 National Policy for Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) in 
NSS [55] 
 Common Criteria  [56] 
 DoD CIO G&PM Acquiring Commercial Software [57] 
 DoDI 8500.2 Information Assurance Implementation [12]  
 DoDD 4630.05 Interoperability and Supportability of IT and NSS 
[58]  
 DoDD 8100.02 Use of Commercial Wireless Devices, Services, and 
Tech in the DoD GIG [59] 
 DoDI 5200.01 DoD Information Security Program and Protection of 
Sensitive Compartmented Information [43] 
 DoDI 5200.44 Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve 
Trusted Systems [60] 
 DoDI 8420.01 Commercial Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
Devices, Systems, and Technologies [61] 
 DoDI 8523.01 Communication Security (COMSEC) [62] 
 DoDI 8552.01 Use of Mobile Code Technologies in DoD 
Information Systems [63] 
 DTM-08–003 The next generation of Common Access Card (CAC) 
Implementation Guidance [64] 
 Executive Order 13556 [65] 
 FIPS PUB 140–2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules [66] 
 FIPS PUB 199 Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 
Info and Info Systems [38] 
 FIPS 200 Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information 
Systems [39] 
 M-05–24 Implementation of HSPD-12 [67] 
 NACSI-6002 Nat’l COMSEC Instruction Protection of Gov’t 
Contractor Telecoms [68] 
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 NSTISSP-101 National Policy on Security Voice Communications 
[69] 
 NIST SP 800–53 R4 Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems [33] 
 NIST SP 800–60 Guide for Mapping Types of Info and Info systems 
to Security Categories [37] 
 NIST SP 800–61 Rev 2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide 
[70] 
 NIST SP 800–153 Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area 
networks [71] 
 The first step of our policy analysis was determining the actual applicability 
of these policies to the unique aspects of mobility. This was accomplished by 
comparing the content of these potentially unique policies to the functional 
requirements and security context for mobile devices. The unique aspects and 
policies derived from this analysis are as follows: 
 High concentrations of PII—Mobile devices store a massive amount 
of PII, beyond what is currently stored on standard information 
system deployed today because of their function as a personal 
digital assistant/organizer. Examples of information that is currently 
stored on these devices include biological information, Social 
Security Number (SSN), driver’s license information, account 
numbers, current location, and contact information (like mother’s 
maiden name). The policy that focused on this unique aspect of 
mobility was the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO Memo DoD guidance on PII. 
 Based on Removable Media—Mobile devices are built upon 
removable media, and are often categorized as removable media in 
current security policies. The reason for this categorization is 
because current policies are written for immobile or docked  
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technologies. The policy that focused on this unique aspect of 
mobility was the CNSSAM IA 1–10 Reducing Risk of Removable 
Media in NSS. 
 Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP)—Mobile devices will more than 
likely have a VOIP client installed as an application. Even if a VOIP 
client is not installed, mobile devices are transitioning to 4G 
communication technologies, which are based on VOIP 
infrastructures [72]. The policies that focused on this unique aspect 
of mobility were the DoDI 8500.2 (ECVI) and CNSSI-5000.   
 PKI and Digital Signatures–Mobile devices may need to utilize the 
PKI infrastructure in a different method than currently deployed 
solutions. The entire process of building and configuring the mobile 
device (from manufacturing, to the ISP, to the user authentication) 
may all enable digital signing and authentication differently with 
different roots of trust. The policies that focused on this unique 
aspect of mobility were the DoDI 8500.2 (DCBP and IATS), 
CNSSP-25, DTM-08–003, and M-05–24. 
 Mobile Code and Application Stores—Mobile devices heavily utilize 
cloud service providers that employ mobile code through a browser 
or mobile application. In addition to mobile code, the mobile 
application store will deploy and update applications in a much 
more rapid manner than currently deployed information systems. 
An additional difference with mobile devices is the nature of 
permissions granted to applications. Each application may have its 
own granular set privileges over data and sensor access on the 
device (like user accounts) instead of the privileges of the account 
that installed the application. The policies that focused on this 
unique aspect of mobility were the DoDD 8100.02, DoDI 8500.2 
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(DCMC, DCSQ, DCSR, ECCD, ECLP, ECML, ECPA, IAAC, and 
VIVM) and DoDI 8552.01. 
 Wireless Access—Mobile devices will connect to a variety of 
different wireless providers, with the primary access being cellular, 
which does not provide the typical network boundary defenses. The 
ownership and network defenses of these wireless providers will 
differ among the DoD, commercial, public, and other mobile 
devices (mesh networking). An additional difference is that mobile 
device may also act as a wireless network access point to other 
devices as well. The policies that focused on this unique aspect of 
mobility were the DoDI 8420.01, DoDI 8500.2 (COEB, DCID, 
EBBD, EBCR, EBPW, ECIC, ECND, and ECWN), and NIST 
SP800–153. 
 Outsourcing of IA and Incident Response—Mobile devices will 
receive transmit, and store information across a wider variety of 
commercial and DoD service providers because of the variety of 
network connection, cloud services, and mobile applications. This 
means a larger coordination effort whenever an incident occurs. 
The policy that focused on this unique aspect of mobility was the 
8500.2 (DCDS and VIIR). 
 Previously Assumed Physical Protection Mechanism—Mobile 
devices will not have the assumed physical protection mechanisms 
that are currently in place for docked/stationary computing devices. 
This is a defense in depth mechanism that will be lost, and may 
have to be recognized and account for in a different manner. This 
also occurred with the transition to laptop and notebook computers, 
which required an emphasis on whole disk encryption. The policy 
that focused on this unique aspect of mobility was the 8500.2 
(PEs). 
 58
It is important to note that there are other areas that will need to be 
considered when developing a complete security policy for mobile devices that 
are not covered in this thesis. Such areas include the security policies for cloud 
service providers, ISPs, and mobile controlled COMSEC equipment. It is also 
important to note that there are additional security policies that apply to mobile 
devices beyond the ones selected. Since the applicability would not differ greatly 
from currently deployed information systems, they are also not covered in this 
thesis.     
 The next step of our policy analysis was to determine if any modifications 
to current organizational security policies are required to support mobile devices. 
This analysis was performed using our definition of organizational security 
policies; they describe the resource that needs to be protected with the 
corresponding level of protection required. After analyzing the policies listed 
above, the answer (in general) was that no modifications are required. Most 
organizational policies stated a specific Information Assurance (IA) requirement 
with corresponding responsibilities for each agency to implement. Therefore, the 
need for modifications to the organizational policies is minimal. However, the 
chances of revisions being necessary increased as specific technological 
requirements were included with the organizational policy. Example of such 
revisions or updates that may be required are: 
 Citing specific technological solutions in organizational security 
policies– A number of policies, such as CNSSP-25, require CAC 
authentication to the DoD PKI, which is a specific form of two-factor 
authentication.   The earlier CAC requires a hard connection that 
may not conform to the way mobile devices are currently being 
utilized. Though there are policies, such as DTM-08–003, that call 
for the next generation of CAC which may resolve these concerns 
by enabling wireless authentication. Another option being 
considered in the updated FIPS 201–2 could include derived 
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credentials, which stores credentials on a tiny microSD card that 
can fit inside mobile devices [73].    
 Mobile devices and PII –As stated earlier, mobile devices will store 
and process massive amounts of PII. Current policies only allow 
mobile devices to store this information by exception, such as 
ASD(NII)/DoD CIO on PII.   Even with this possible exception, such 
devices are required to be stored in a “protected workplace” that 
meets the physical and environment controls for confidentiality level 
of sensitive. There is a high probability that these devices will need 
to be used outside of these “protected workplaces,” so these 
policies will likely need to be updated to reflect technical vice 
physical protections.    
 Categorizing Mobile Devices as Removable Media– Currently there 
are policies, such as CNSSAM IA 1–10, that categorize mobile 
devices as removable media (such as Compact Disks (CDs), Digital 
Video Disks (DVDs), thumb drives, Universal Serial Bus (USB) 
storage). When mobile devices are placed in this category in 
policies, they end up having inappropriate security restrictions 
placed on the mobile devices. When categorized this way, the 
appropriate controls are not applied to secure such devices.     
 VOIP and Mobile Devices in Secure Spaces– Currently mobile 
devices, especially using VOIP, are not permitted in accordance to 
policy since they cannot meet the current requirements. This is due 
to the fact that mobile devices not meet the security requirements, 
such as those for voice instruments described in CNSS-5000. In 
order to utilize mobile device in secured spaces, a new set of 
security requirements and mechanisms may be necessary. This 
could be an area of future research.    
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 Mobile Code from Trusted DoD Sources– The ownership of a 
BYOD mobile devices, and personality, would have to be 
determined in order to analyze the level of policy applicability. If it is 
determined that the whole device, or information system, is owned 
and controlled by the DoD, then policies like DoDI 5200.44 would 
apply for mobile code.   This would mean that mobile code used on 
other personalities, such as personal, may be restricted to trusted 
DoD sources defeating a major functional purpose of BYOD. If this 
is the case, the policy may need to be updated with restrictions of 
information flow vice prohibition.  
 Environmental Controls—The DoDI 8420.01 states that Access 
Points (APs) used in unclassified WLANs should not be installed in 
unprotected environments due to an increased risk of tampering 
and/or theft. Mobile devices are now on demand access points that 
are not always located in a protected environment, for example a 
user’s home.   
 Personal Use of services on DoD devices– Currently there are 
policies, such as DoDI 8500.2, that restrict personal use of services 
on DoD devices. If it is determined that BYOD mobile devices are 
owned and controlled by the DoD, than current policies restrict use 
of personal services such as VOIP (DoDI 8500.2 ECVI-1). This may 
mean that that current policies may need to be updated to reflect 
restrictions of information flow vice prohibition.  
We have now analyzed the organizational security policies in regards to the 
unique aspects of mobility. In summary, a small number of the current 
organizational policies affect the unique aspects of a mobile device.   This is due 
to these policies being rightfully technology independent.   Of that small number 
of policies that affect the unique aspects of mobility, an even smaller portion  
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would have to be modified to accommodate the mobile devices discussed in this 
document.   With this analysis completed, we move down to the next level of 
security policy to security controls. 
3. Security Controls 
Security controls are put in place to enforce organizational objectives for 
information systems while remaining device independent. At the security control 
level, we chose to address the DoD 8500.2 controls above and focus on the 
NIST controls documented in the NIST SP 800.53. Although the DoDI 8500.2 
controls exist, they are being updated to reflect the NIST SP 800.53 controls. Of 
the NIST 800.53 revisions, we chose revision 4 because it is the most recent 
version and updated to include some mobility issues.   
As noted earlier there are a wide variety of controls listed in NIST SP 
800.53. However, not all of the controls are relevant or require special 
consideration when applying them to mobile devices. We organize the mobile 
device aspects of security controls into two categories in respect to our 
previously listed use cases. These categories are “mobile interesting” and 
“mobile unique.”  Mobile interesting controls are addressed in the NIST SP 
800.53, but require modification or special consideration when applying them to 
mobile devices as compared to more traditional information systems. Mobile 
unique controls are ones that we believe must be added to the NIST security 
controls baseline to address mobile devices, our use cases, or DoD security 
policy objectives. To begin our categorization of these controls, we will start with 
the security control families (e.g., Access Control and Configuration 
Management). From these control families, we will continue to categorize these 
controls based on the family identifier and control number (e.g., AC-2 and CM-2) 
[33]. Using this process of categorization, we will begin with documenting mobile 
interesting security controls: 
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a. Family:  Access Control (AC) [33] 
The “access control” family of controls addresses account 
management, access to systems, and access to information. The mobile 
interesting portion of this family is where the mobile device supports multiple 
personalities. Each personality may implement access control differently. As 
such, the device should support all the implementations without allowing them to 
conflict with each other. With personalities, the user is the same person 
accessing each personality, but account management may be handled differently 
across the personalities. For example, the employer personality may require two 
factor authentication. Whereas the user’s personality may require a four-digit pin.   
Some of the specific control issues to consider are: 
 AC-2 Account Management [33]:  Accounts will not be 
system specific but personality specific. As such, there must 
be a way for an administrator to terminate account access 
even in the BYOD scenario where the government does not 
own the device. Simply put how does one provision and un-
provision the DoD personality access? 
 AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement [33]:  Enforcing the flow 
of information is essential to all our use cases for mobile 
devices. Mobile devices should allow one to share 
information with the user who is central to all the 
personalities without allowing unapproved information into a 
separate COI. On the other hand, as is the case for use 
cases involving the camera and GPS for instance, the 
personalities share the use of the mobile device 
resources/capabilities. Therefore, these resources must be 
able to properly enforce not only the flow of personality 
provided information but also the flow of information 
generated by the resource. For instance, in the battlefield, a 
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picture taken for intelligence purposes should not be sent 
automatically to the user’s Google+ account. 
 AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement [33]:  The information 
flow among applications, sensors, and wide array of wireless 
networks is unique to mobile devices. An example of such a 
unique requirement is the precedence of access to sensors; 
for example when two domains want continuous access to a 
sensor to perform a function, which domain obtains access 
and for how long?  Another example would be the sensitivity 
of information as perceoeved by different personalities; when 
an application is pulling sensitive (e.g., CUI) sensor 
information in a government domain, should a personal 
domain be allowed to pull the same sensor information 
concurrently or even a second later?  All of these questions 
and more would have to be addressed to securely enable 
BYOD and multiple personality mobile device.   
 AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts [33]:  Mobile devices are 
unique in that they can be easily left in areas in which they 
are unprotected and therefore easily fallen to the wrong 
hands. As is the case, this means unsuccessful logon 
attempts could be a good indication of compromise. 
Therefore, rather than simply locking the device, it may be 
wise to zeroize the device when a number of unsuccessful 
logon attempts occur. However, this functionality should be 
personality dependent. The DoD personality may want to be 
zeroized after 3 unsuccessful attempts, but maybe another 
personality may not require zeroization at all. Therefore, only 
the appropriate personality should be zeroized at the 
appropriate time, while leaving high availability or emergency 
services available. 
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 AC-8 System Use Notification [33]:  In the mobile device 
BYOD use cases, it is not likely the DoD would be able to 
justify monitoring all activity on a personal device. 
Additionally, system notification is system centric whereas 
on a mobile device, maybe access control focus should be 
on the DoD information stored on the device.  
 AC-16: Hardware Root of Trust [33]:  “Mobile devices are not 
capable of providing strong security assurances to end users 
and organizations; these devices lack the hardware-based 
roots of trust that are increasingly built into laptops and other 
types of hosts.” [74]   This hardware-based root of trust may 
be essential to providing remote COIs (owners) the ability to 
verify the state of the device, either prior to placing a 
personality on it or after for monitoring. 
b. Family: Audit and Accountability (AU) [33]    
The audit and accountability family of controls address the data, 
policy, procedures and processes required for an information system to record 
security relevant activities with individual accountability.   For mobile devices, this 
would most likely occur through a MDM solution. The mobile interesting portions 
of this family of controls focuses on the mobile device’s multiple personalities, 
increased number sensors, numerous communication infrastructure, hardware 
limitations, and high availability needs (such as military radio and emergency 
phone calls). Specifically the mobile interesting controls are: 
 AU-2 AUDIT EVENTS [33]:  Since there are potential 
security conflicts occur when several personalities access 
sensor information at the same time (detailed in the security 
misuse cases), organization-defined auditable events should 
include when multiple personalities access sensors or the 
communication infrastructure at the same time. This would 
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be used to help detect when sensitive information is being 
provided to the wrong domain or when a domain is 
attempting to communicate using a prohibited medium. It 
would also be useful for organization-defined auditable 
events to include when the device is being used outside of 
its typical geographical area (such as GPS, compass, or 
barometric sensors) to detect possible theft or misuse, since 
the probability of this occurrence will increase with mobile 
devices.     
 AU-3 AUDIT CONTENT [33]: Mobile devices are able to 
utilize a wide variety of additional sensor information that 
could help increase the security posture of these devices. 
One such sensor is GPS, which could be utilized in 
researching or resolving security relevant events. To achieve 
this, audit data should include where the device is being 
used when an auditing event occurs, while recording the 
communication interface being utilized at the time of the 
event (such as GPS, compass, or barometric sensors). 
 AU-4 AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY [33]: Mobile devices are 
by nature resource limited. As such, the storage capacity of 
these devices is limited. It would not take a long time to fill 
the device with logs hindering functionality, creating a denial 
of service. Since the device requires connectivity for many of 
its functional activities, this connectivity should be used to 
store audit logs via MDM solution. The device could be the 
contingent audit storage location when connectivity fails. As 
such, the logs should be protected accordingly when being 
transmitted across networks of a various levels of 
confidentiality.    
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 AU-6 AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING [33]:   
Mobile devices will contain information from all aspects of 
the user’s life. This could cause some complexities when 
audit logs contain data from different personal and work 
related organizations. One such complexity would be the 
responsibility and authority of a single organization collecting 
all of this log information for review, analysis, and reporting. 
One example could be private log data, such as browsing 
history on non-work related personalities. The user would 
not want private data being reported for review and analysis 
by the employer. A possible way of implementing this 
protection could be a policy that adjudicates other log 
policies among personalities. 
 AU-8 TIME STAMPS [33]:  Mobile devices with multiple 
personalities could run into a situation where each 
personality obtains its time from a different organizationally 
approved source. This could cause complexities when there 
is a review of audit logs to determine an event’s actual time 
of occurrence. This could be a potential area of future 
research. 
 AU-5 RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES 
[33]:  Mobile devices will provide functionality with high 
availability needs, such as military radios and emergency 
phone calls.   As such, these functions with high availability 
needs should stay functional when audit failures occur. To 
achieve this, the device could possibly enter a degraded 
operational mode for functions with lower availability needs. 
If such a mitigation does not occur, there exists the 
possibility of an attack on a mobile device when the logs are  
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purposefully filled up to create a denial of service. Policies 
and procedures for handling this situation could be an area 
of future research. 
 AU-13 MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
[33]: As discussed earlier in this document, mobile devices 
will have sensors that communicate with applications that 
can automatically post information collected to cloud 
services (e.g., GPS location or photographs to foursquare 
[75] or facebook [76]). This could have significant security 
ramifications, if sensor information is being collected by a 
sensitive domain, while other domains (e.g., personal) are 
still recording and posting that same information publicly. To 
detect such actions, the organization should employ an 
automated mechanism for monitoring if sensor information 
from mobile devices is being disclosed in an unauthorized 
manner to open source sites, for example foursquare [75]. 
 AU-16 CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING [33]:  Mobile 
devices could have applications within a personality that 
transmit information outside of the organization that 
deployed it. The organization should audit information for 
such information, to detect when sensitive information is 
being improperly provided to an organization without proper 
authorization. Mobile devices could have also applications 
within a personality that communicate with other applications 
in other personalities.   All such actions should be audited. 
c. Family: Configuration Management (CM) [33]  
The configuration management family of controls addresses how 
the configuration of the information system is known and subsequently 
controlled. For mobile devices, this is performed through Mobile Device 
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Management (MDM) solutions deployed by each organization, or COI.   
Considering the fact that mobile devices are intended to be configured and 
altered by the user according to their perceived needs, there are many 
interesting aspects to the application of CM.   Policy may need to be created that 
deal with the ownership and management of the MDM services for the BYOD 
use-case scenario. 
 CM-2 Baseline Configuration [33]:  In a BYOD scenario there 
will have to be specific MDM solutions for each configuration 
authorized for access to the system and there would have to 
be a way for the organization to ensure the device initially 
and routinely meets these requirements. This would be a 
major part of the assumptions, which would have to be made 
about the security capabilities of the device to enforce our 
multiple personality scenarios. 
 CM-3 Configuration Change Control [33]:  In this control, the 
organization is expected to specify what changes must be 
addressed by the configuration control process. For a BYOD 
mobile device, could the organization have an expectation of 
controlling a portion of the configuration within other 
personalities, how much of the configuration could be 
device-specific versus personality specific?  
 CM-5 Access Control for Change [33]:  This control requires 
the organization to control physical and logical access 
associated with changes to the information system. Here 
again it is interesting how the control should be implemented 
considering the BYOD and/or multiple use case scenarios. 
The organization should be assured of certain configurations 
which include the required assumptions for implementing 
their information protection policies, but how much can the 
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organization control a BYOD device, and how much should 
the organization allow the user to change configuration of 
the other personalities?     
 CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions [33]:  In a multiple 
personality use case or particularly with a BYOD use case, 
the implementation of this control must consider the personal 
use of the device and how much the organization can and 
should restrict the user from doing with their personality 
and/or their own device. 
 CM-11 User Installed Software [33]:  Particularly with mobile 
devices which rely on an “application market” concept for 
provisioning the device, users may be able to download and 
install software for all personalities. In our use cases where 
the individual has a personal personality on the device, the 
intent is to allow the user to install any application they find 
in the commercial market place.   In this use case, the user 
could install malware or application normally deemed 
inappropriate for use on an information system associated 
with the DoD. 
d. Family:  Incident Response (IR) 
The Incident Response (IR) family of controls address the policy, 
procedures and processes required to prepare for and respond to security 
incidents involving an information system. The mobile interesting portions of this 
family of controls focuses on the mobile device’s cloud services and mobile 
carrier access.    Specifically the mobile interesting controls are: 
 IR-4 and IR-7 INCIDENT HANDLING [33]:  Mobile devices 
will be heavily reliant on mobile carriers and cloud service 
providers for storing, processing, and transmitting 
information. Because of this reliance, organizations using 
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mobile devices will need to actively coordinate with mobile 
carriers and cloud service providers in planning and 
responding to incidents. This coordination should include 
sharing incident response capabilities, protection 
mechanism, and points of contact. A firm understanding 
should be in place among these partners to understand 
where information transmission, storage, and processing is 
taking place to help identify information systems or system 
components that may be subsequently contaminated. 
Organizations would also benefit from coordinating with 
mobile carriers and cloud service providers to correlate and 
share incident information to achieve a cross organization 
perspective on incident awareness. 
e. Family: Media Protection (MP)  
The Media Protection (MP) family of controls address the policy, 
procedures and processes required to protect digital and non-digital media. The 
mobile interesting portions of this family of controls focuses on the mobile 
device’s storage, removable storage, and personalities.  
 MP-4 MEDIA STORAGE and MP-5 MEDIA TRANSPORT 
[33]:  Mobile devices will store information on media that 
would typically have additional layers of physical protection. 
These layers of physical protection are not available for 
mobile devices because they will be transported outside of 
controlled areas frequently. To help protect against the risk 
of sensitive information being stored on digital media while 
transported outside of controlled areas, cryptographic 
mechanisms could be used to provide confidentiality and 
integrity protections.   
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 MP-6 MEDIA SANITIZATION [33]:  Mobile devices will 
access and store information at a CUI level and higher. As 
such, they present a risk to these protected information 
systems that processes CUI. The first way this risk is 
incurred is when the mobile devices are connecting to CUI 
information systems directly from the vendor or after being 
directly exposed to the cyber threats on the Internet.   To 
protect against this risk, the mobile devices should be 
sanitized in a non-destructive manner prior to creating new 
CUI or “higher” personality or when connecting to a new CUI 
or higher information systems, as policy permits. The 
organization should also have the capability to remotely wipe 
individual files or entire personalities when the device is 
stolen, compromised, or the user no longer requires that 
personality. 
 MP-7 MEDIA USE [33]:  Mobile devices with different 
personalities and classification levels may have access to 
removable media. As such, these personalities may require 
protection mechanisms to limit the access of the information 
stored on the media to a specific CUI or to other 
personalities and applications.   The mobile device should 
support such separation, through mechanisms such as 
cryptography or access control lists managed and enforced 
by the underlying infrastructure of the device. When a 
personality is no longer required, or no longer requires 
removable media access, the removable media should have 
the capability of being sanitized.   
 MP-8 MEDIA DOWNGRADING [33]:  Mobile devices will 
have personalities that store information with different levels 
of classification, such as CUI or PII, that may come and go 
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with time. To accommodate these role changes, the mobile 
device should have a downgrading process to include the 
removal of a personality with CUI or data and programs with 
“higher” information.   There may also be times that 
information, from items such as sensors, is obtained in a 
personality at a CUI or higher level of sensitivity. The mobile 
device should have the capability to downgrade the 
sensitivity of such information in accordance to an 
organizationally defined policy. 
f. Family: Identification and Authentication (IA) [33] 
The Identification and Authentication (IA) family of controls address 
the data, policy, procedures and processes required for supplying and verifying 
identification information for the information system to make proper authorization 
decisions. The mobile interesting portions of this family of controls focuses on the 
mobile device’s context aware functionality, wearable computing, mesh 
networking, and mobile carrier access.    Specifically the mobile interesting 
controls are: 
 IA-2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
(ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) [33]:  Certain policies that 
made sense for desktop computers may not make sense for 
mobile devices. We propose that pin and passcodes are one 
of those policies for mobile devices. Forcing a pin or 
passcode prior to obtaining information from a mobile device 
will hinder functional use cases, or cause potential 
dangerous security exceptions (as documented earlier in 
“alerting terrorists of U.S. friendly forces”). As such, we 
would want to still authenticate the user to the device, but 
potentially use a different combination of something you 
have, know, and are. This is could be made possible 
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because the device has the capability of context awareness 
with additional detailed information on its user. In relation to 
authorization, identification on one personality should not 
necessarily permit access to another personality unless 
agreed upon by security policies of the COIs involved. 
Describing and implementing this policy and functionality is a 
subject further research.    
 IA-3 DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
[33]: In accordance to our functional use cases, mobile 
devices could communicate with other mobile devices to 
create a mesh network. Mobile devices will also 
communicate with other sensor devices to collect data about 
the user and outside world. This raises the question of 
identification and authentication of these devices to each 
other. This means that organizations will have to define the 
devices requiring unique device-to-device identification and 
authentication. This will require further analysis, and could 
be an area of future research.  
 IA-8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-
ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) [33]:  Currently most patching 
of the mobile devices is performed through privileged access 
provided by mobile service providers. This may need to be 
addressed through a strong partnership between the COIs 
and the mobile service providers to uniquely identify and 
authenticate such access. This could be an area of future 
research.   
 IA-10 ADAPTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND 
AUTHENTICATION [33]: Adversaries may compromise 
individual authentication mechanisms and subsequently 
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attempt to impersonate legitimate users. This situation can 
potentially occur with any authentication mechanisms 
employed by organizations. To address this threat, 
organizations may employ specific techniques/mechanisms 
and establish protocols to assess suspicious behavior. For 
mobile devices, such a suspicious behavior could be 
identified when information/service are accessed at unusual 
times and locations. In these situations, when certain pre-
established conditions or triggers occur, organizations can 
require selected individuals to provide additional 
authentication information. Again, this is a topic for future 
research. 
g. Family:  System and Communication Protection Control 
(SC) [33]  
The System and Communication protection (SC) control family 
focuses on system security and the protection of information in transit. For a 
mobile device, what is most interesting about this control is the nature of how the 
mobile device may communicate to the associated communities of interest. One 
must consider how to protect confidentiality and integrity of communication when 
the networking layer is owned and operated by a third party. This forces the 
mobile device in our use cases to implement a context aware security policy. 
 SC-6 RESOURCE AVAILABILITY [33]: Mobile devices may 
be the primary communication medium for their users to the 
outside world. As such, they may need a higher level of 
assurance for availability than their notebook or desktop 
counterpart. This can be demonstrated with functions that 
were previously performed over radio on the battlefield or 
emergency phone calls performed over analog signal. 
Additional security protections such as Denial of Service 
 75
(DoS) prevention, priority of communication services, and 
higher assurance of communication services/application may 
be required. As we progress towards 4G/VOIP, where DoS 
attacks and loss of availability may become more prevalent, 
this higher assurance requirement of availability may 
become self-evident. Some example functional security 
requirements that could be included are redundancy in 
communication protocols and services; or a minimum set of 
communication applications available upon certain levels of 
device failure. 
 SC-7 BOUNDAY PROTECTION [33]:  Mobile devices use 
many different networks to communicate. Many of these 
networks may be owned by third party commercial or private 
parties. As such, these networks may not afford the 
protections offered by the organizational (COI managed) 
network. Therefore, one must consider whether or not a 
mobile device requires boundary protection. For instance, a 
mobile device using an airport hot spot service should be 
able to implement some sort of self boundary protection. 
However, it may also restrict network access on a given 
personality unless the device has implemented a VPN with 
the associated COI. 
 SC-10 NETWORK DISCONNECT [33]:  Typically network 
disconnect makes sense for making sure secure 
communication are not left open for potential exploitation 
and to protect against resource consumption. However, one 
of the assumptions of the mobile devices is that they are 
“always on.”  Due to these assumptions, there are multiple 
reasons why one may want to keep communications open to 
a mobile device. For instance, there may be situations where 
 76
long term collaboration is required such as for a 
teleconferencing or team communication during a mission. In 
the form of unintentional network disconnects, future 
research, related to the information transport layer, should 
be considered for the deployment of mobile devices on the 
battlefield as TCP-IP may not be the best choice for noisy, 
burst heavy, and high-latency environments. 
 SC-11 Trusted Path [33]:  An additional enhancement might 
be needed to protect against the increased probability of the 
mobile device being swapped for a similar mobile device that 
steals the users’ credentials. This could be accomplished by 
the device authenticating to the user (eg hardware based 
certificate or picture on login screen). Along the same lines, 
a “trusted path” might be required. This would be enabled to 
provide assurance that one is talking to the appropriate 
device, OS, COI, or application. 
 SC-15 COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES [33]: 
Context awareness can provide security features not 
previously possible. An example of such a use cases would 
be included in collaborative computing devices control, such 
as disabling / removal functionality in secure work areas. An 
example of such a collaborative computing device being 
restricted by context awareness would be turning off a 
camera. Additionally consideration must be given for the 
privacy of the individual especially for a BYOD use case. 
The expectation is the mobile device is always near the 
owner. Therefore, remotely activated collaboration aspects 
of a mobile device will have to be considered very closely. 
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 SC-28 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST [33]:   
Mobile devices are particularly vulnerable to theft, loss, or 
physical tampering/exploitation. For this reason, mobile 
devices in particular should protect information at rest. 
Additionally, it would be useful to implement some sort of 
additional protection measure to wipe the information either 
remotely or when an authorized attempt is made to access 
the device such as it is written in the 8th enhancement to the 
control MP-6 MEDIAN SANITIZATION. 
 SC-40 OPERATIONS SECURITY [33]: There are several 
OPSEC consideration related to mobile devices that should 
be evaluated. As is the case with a laptop, when in public the 
screen for a mobile device can be read by a passerby. When 
used for voice communications, someone close by can listen 
in on at least half the communication. Also, mobile devices 
can sometimes be left unattended with the device unlocked 
at least until the inactivity timeout. In these situations, it 
would be possible for someone to pick up the device and 
“look around” for information. Finally, the government has a 
tendency to purchase a certain “profile” device which could 
indicate to an “outsider” that the owner works for the DoD. 
Additionally, it is still common to allow complete strangers to 
use your mobile phone when they are in need. In these 
cases, they have open access to the phone and it is possible 
they could use this opportunity to access information they 
are not authorized to access. These situations must be 
considered and mitigations developed in order to address 
any opportunity for exploitation. 
 SC-42 SENSOR DATA [33]:  In a multiple personality 
environment there are two new considerations:  First, 
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sensors may need to be restricted based on context and the 
COI required security policy. For instance, when the user 
enters a classified space, the camera must be disabled. 
Second, COIs may want to remotely control sensors on the 
mobile device, this access will have to be managed as the 
sensors are a shared resource.      
 SC-43 USAGE RESTRICTIONS [33]:   Many mobile devices 
allow the user to add additional storage via flash drive. Even 
in a BYOD use case, there will have to be restrictions on the 
use of such media in order to protect the trustworthiness of 
the platform. Other more simple uses must be addressed. As 
discussed earlier, what if someone asks to make a phone 
call with your mobile device?  In these cases, it is not 
prudent to allow others to use the mobile device since they 
will have access to all the information on the phone.  
h. Family: System and Information Integrity (SI) [33] 
The System and Information Integrity (SI) family of controls assure 
the accuracy and reliability of the information and system, and prevent 
unauthorized modification. [44] The mobile interesting portions of this family of 
controls focuses on the personalities, COIs, resource limitations, and mobile 
carrier access.    Specifically the mobile interesting controls are: 
 SI-2 FLAW REMEDIATION [33]:  Currently most operating 
system patching of the mobile devices is provided by mobile 
service carriers. This may need to be addressed through a 
strong partnership with mobile service carriers to allow patch 
distribution only upon the code/patch/change being signed 
by a government authority.   One potential drawback of such 
a solution is a delay in software updates, leaving the updates 
of these devices lagging behind the commercial sector. Most 
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patches for applications are currently provided through an 
application store, which may or may not be owned by the 
organization that owns the personality or domain. This will 
also take strong partnerships and coordination among the 
developers, the COI(s) and the service carriers to ensure 
software updates are tested for security, effectiveness and 
potential side effects. 
 SI-3 MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION [33]:  The 
deployment of malicious code protection will need to be 
carefully weighed against resource availability on the mobile 
device to ensure that the required protection is provided 
while leaving the device operational. Ideally malicious code 
protection would take place in the app stores, within each 
personality, as well as at a level below each personality 
(watching the watcher). For the layer below each personality, 
and other critical interfaces or privileged applications, 
malicious code protection may be required for detection of 
unauthorized commands. Unauthorized operating system 
commands include, for example, commands that access 
kernel functions from information system processes that are 
not trusted to initiate such commands, or commands for 
kernel functions that are suspicious even though commands 
of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate.    
 SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING. EXTERNAL 
[33]: Currently most external interfaces for mobile devices 
are managed by service carriers or providers. As such, 
different COI’s may require these boundaries to be 
monitored. This may need to be addressed through a strong 
partnership with service carriers or access providers, to 
include who owns the results from monitoring activities. 
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Another option could be VPNs back to the organization’s, or 
COI’s, network defense suite.   Once these options are 
decided, there will need to be a determination on how private 
user data within their private personality will be handled, 
while monitoring, to ensure that there is no violation of 
privacy. This may require current policies to be updated.       
 SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING [33]:  
INTERNAL: For internal system monitoring as mentioned 
earlier for malicious code protection, the same carefully 
weighing of options would also need to take place. For 
example, the decision on which products would belong in 
each personality and “below” each personality (e.g., intrusion 
detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, malicious 
code protection software, audit record monitoring software, 
network monitoring software). It would be useful, if resources 
allow, to integrate intrusion detection tools into access 
control and flow control mechanisms below the personality. 
This could allow for rapid response to attacks by enabling 
reconfiguration of these mechanisms in support of attack 
isolation and elimination. For example, if a personality is 
deemed a threat, it could be isolated completely from the 
other personalities, network interfaces, and mobile device.    
 SI-7 SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION 
INTEGRITY [33]:  Since mobile devices will allow execution 
of code obtained from various sources, including possibly 
commercial application stores, the software will need to be 
confined virtually to the deploying organization’s personality. 
This could be accomplished through multiple domains on the 
device. Roots of trust should also be used since information 
owners, COIs, will have to rely on remote mechanism to 
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ensure software, firmware, and information integrity. Along 
with the roots of trust, there should also exist certificate 
chains to help further establish a chain of trust among the 
user, applications, OS, Device and COIs. The architecture, 
organization, management/application and distribution of 
such certificates is  an area of future research.  
 SI-14 NON-PERSISTENCE [33]:  It may be useful to 
mitigate against “advanced persistent threats” [33] by 
significantly reducing the targeting capability of adversaries 
(i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to 
initiate and complete cyber-attacks. This could be done for 
highly sensitive personalities by making them non-persistent. 
This could possibly be accomplished through domain 
virtualization and automatic restoration of the personality 
when needed. 
i. Family: Personnel Security (PS) [33]  
The Personnel Security (PS) family of controls covers personnel 
actions to include screening personnel and access agreements. Here again the 
focus appears to be on system access versus access to information. For 
instance: 
 PS-3 Personnel Screening [33]:  This control focuses on 
allowing access to an information system. However, the 
main concern is access to information. In the BYOD use 
case, the individual will already have access to their own 
information and physical system. If other COIs vet their 
members prior to granting them access to that community’s 
information, that should be a precursor to instantiating those 
COI’s presence on the mobile device.   
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 PS-4 Personnel Termination [33]:  There must be provision 
for removing information or access to the information from 
the mobile device even if the device is personally owned with 
a DoD personality. In our use cases where multiple 
personalities are accessed on the device, the DoD COIs 
must have the ability to ensure that their personalities are 
erasable from the device and must have a way of ensuring 
that that erasure has occurred. 
 PS-6 Access Agreements [33]:  Access agreements must 
now consider the multi-personality environment. Particularly, 
the DoD must consider what activities are not allowed on a 
multiple personality device. For instance, if on my personal 
personality I choose to visit a gambling site the government 
would normally consider an inappropriate use of resources, 
should the government block this activity?  Furthermore, in 
the case of a BYOD mobile device, what are the 
expectations for behavior and what are the limits of what the 
government or any other organization should control?  What 
about political activities associated with the device, what 
should the limitations be in these cases? 
j. Mobile Unique Security Controls: 
NIST has already recognized some unique challenges created by 
mobile devices. On the latest draft of NIST SP 800–53 revision 4, at least the 
following exist as controls specifically meant for application to mobile devices: 
 AC-19 ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES [33]:–
This control addresses how an organization should control 
access of mobile devices to organizational information 
systems to include usage restrictions. This control also 
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addresses supporting access control on the device through 
either full service or container-based encryption 
 AC-7 (2) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | PURGE / 
WIPE MOBILE DEVICE [33]: This enhancement for AC-7 
specifically addresses purging mobile devices when the 
password is entered incorrectly a defined number of times. 
This could be very useful for mobile devices since they can 
be easily lost or stolen due to their mobile nature. 
 MP-6 (8) MEDIA SANITIZATION | REMOTE PURGING / 
WIPING OF INFORMATION [33]: This control is similar to 
the previous one in that the potential situation is recognized 
where a mobile device could be lost or stolen. In this 
situation, it may be best to protect confidentiality by remotely 
purging the information stored on the device. In a multiple 
personality environment one would have to consider whether 
all personalities should be erased with one command or 
single personalities based on COI controlled 
implementations.   
 SC-7 BOUNDARY PROTECTION [33]: Considering the 
same situation as noted in MP-6 where a mobile device is 
either lost or stolen, not only should there be a functionality 
to purge resident information but it would also be useful to 
ban the device from access to the COI(s) in order to ensure 
boundary protection. Although, the device may require user 
I&A for access to the device, COI services are often set up 
to push data, alerts, and notifications on behalf of the user. 




boundary layer. Therefore, we may need to erase this 
relationship upon the realization that the device has been 
lost or stolen.  
We also believe there is opportunity to provide additional controls 
specifically for the mobile devices. These controls are as follows: 
 SC-XX Phone only Mode–Many of today’s mobile devices 
are mobile phones. There are many cases where normal 
phone use assumes immediate access to the phone 
functionality usually without the requirement for Identification 
and Authentication (I&A). There is a NIST control which 
addresses part of this concern. AC-14 PERMITTED 
ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION AND 
AUTHENTICATION [33] specifically addresses receiving 
calls without having to log in. But we need a way to specify 
that phone can be placed in a mode where all other 
functionality is restricted and only the phone functionality 
exists unless or until the user provides I&A. It is conceivable 
the mobile device owner may be solicited by a co-worker, 
friend, family member, or even a stranger to use the phone. 
In these cases, it would be prudent to lock out the temporary 
user from any other functionality. This control could also 
cover emergency call capabilities for mobile phones. This 
control would also be related to SC-24 FAIL IN KNOWN 
STATE [33], as you would not want one to be able to 
circumvent security implementations by forcing a system 
failure while it is in “phone only” mode. Note, this control 
would exclude VOIP applications existing within a particular 
personality. In these cases I&A would have to be established 
before using the VOIP capabilities. 
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 AC-XX Events Driven Access Control–Related to SC-42 
SENSOR DATA [33] and SC-43 USAGE RISTRICTIONS 
[33], this control could be an enhancement to AC-3 ACCESS 
ENFORCEMENT [33]. This control would specify the ability 
to dynamically enforce access control lists, which could be 
altered dynamically, based on events or environmental 
context, as defined by the information flow enforcement. 
We initially considered Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) as a mobile 
unique control for addition to the NIST catalog. However, we determined the 
existing controls already include this concept. AC-20, USE OF EXTERNAL 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS [33], covers all the elements we believe are required 
to control the use of personal devices.   
Next we considered how the NIST controls cover our main concept 
of “multiple personalities” as separate security domains but with a “consolidated 
user experience.”  After evaluating the controls, one could make the case that 
this concept is covered by multiple controls. For instance, the following controls 
could be added to a mobile device specific baseline to guide implementation of 
such a security construct: 
 AC-4 [33], Information Flow Enforcement, covers the ability 
to control the flow of information. This is fundamental for 
maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of multiple 
personalities.   
 AC-15 [33], Security Attributes, could be required to ensure 
information would be labeled to support access control.   
 AC-19 [33], Access Control for Mobile Devices, determines 
usage restrictions for mobile devices and specifies full-
service or container based encryption for confidentiality and 
integrity of information.  
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 AC-25 [33], Reference Monitor, there must be a functionality 
that exists at some lower level than the applications that 
enforces access control.  
 SC-16 [33], Transmission of Security Attributes, allows 
information received form a particular Community of Interest 
(COI) to be labeled for a particular personality.  
 SC-7 [33], Boundary Protection, is required to provide 
confidentiality of the personalities.  
 SC-8 [33], Transmission Integrity and Confidentiality, would 
be used to maintain personality to COI confidentiality and 
integrity.  
 SC-39 [33], Process Isolation, and SC-4 [33], Information in 
shared resources, are required to maintain confidentiality 
and integrity of personalities on the device.  
However, we believe the NIST controls are written in a paradigm 
where an information system is implementing either a comparable multilevel 
security construct or a single level security construct. In our construct, we 
propose independent multiple level security domains. Therefore, we conclude the 
NIST mobile device baseline approach would not be explicit enough. A new 
control is required in order to create the correct context security levels. 
Otherwise, we believe this type of construct would be simply avoided as a 
possible implementation. Therefore, we propose our final mobile unique control: 
SC-XY Multiple Independent Security Domains—This control would 
specify the need to ensure the information system can support the information 
flow of multiple independent security domains. It would address the requirement 
to determine an appropriate security flow and offer sub-controls or 
enhancements to cover the security implementations such as container-based 
encryption of the DoD personality, thin client implementation, or the requirement 
of a trusted process to act as a reference monitor [77]. This control would also 
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have to address the requirement for security attributes, specifically labeling 
versus non-labeled container-based access control implementations where the 
container is the personality. The related controls would be:  SC-XX Phone only 
Mode, AC-XX Events Driven Access Control, AC-4 Information Flow 
Enforcement [33], AC-15 Security Attributes [33], AC-25 Reference Monitor [33], 
SC-16 transmission of security attributes [33], SC-7 Boundary Protection [33], 
SC-8 Transmission Integrity and Confidentiality [33], SC-39 Process Isolation 
[33], SC-4 Information in Shared Resources [33], and SC-42 Sensor Data [33].  
4. System Specific Implementation 
After addressing the IA controls, the next step would be analyzing the 
system specific implementation requirement. Our initial system specific 
implementation analysis started with determining all the applicable System 
Specific Implementation (SSI) policies. The original list of all system specific 
implementation policies was obtained from DISA, the National Security Agency 
(NSA), and NIST. The implementation policies applicable to mobile devices are: 
 DISA Mobile Operating System Security Requirements Guide [78] 
 DISA Mobile Device Management Security Requirements Matrix 
[79] 
 DISA Mobile Applications Security Requirements Guide [80] 
 DISA Mobile Policy Security Requirements Guide [81] 
 DISA General Mobile Device (Non-enterprise Activated) STIG  [82] 
 NIST SP 800–124 Guidelines for Managing & Securing Mobile 
Devices in the Enterprise (Draft) [4] 
 NIST Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in Mobile Devices 
(Draft) [74]  
 NSA Mobility Capability Package [83] 
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Given the time constraints and scope constraints for this thesis, DISA’s 
Security Requirements Guides (SRGs) were the set of system specific 
implementation policies selected for inclusion into our security policy analysis. 
DISA SRGs represents an intermediate step between Information Assurance (IA) 
controls and mobile product-specific implementation information.   Our analysis 
of the DISA SRGs determined that all comments associated with these 
documents have already been included in our IA control review. The only unique 
comment would apply to the SRGs would be an update or new element to 
accommodate the mobile devices discussed in this document. With that being 
said, the summary of the mobile interesting security policy topics that would have 
to be addressed from the SRGs and IA controls are: 
 Provisioning and de-provisioning access to the DoD personality 
(AC-2) [33]  
 Information flow among personalities, applications, sensors, and a 
wide array of wireless networks. Including the confidentiality, 
integrity, and auditing of such information and information flows. 
(AC-4) (AU-2) (MP-4) (MP-7) (SC-9) [33] 
 Wiping/zeroizing a personality without affecting the other 
personalities on the device (AC-7) [33] 
 DoD collecting, monitoring, and reporting personal activities on a 
non-DoD provisioned personality. This would include the ability of 
the DoD to restrict personal applications and services on a non-
DoD provisioned personality. (AC-8) (CM-10) (AU-6) [33] 
 Configuration Management of the device and personalities (device-
specific versus personality specific) (CM-3) [33] 
 Coordinating and Managing the official time source among 
personalities for security services such as auditing (AU-8) [33] 
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 Level of access provided to mobile service carriers for patching and 
servicing mobile devices. This would also include items such as 
mobile devices only accepting patches signed by the hosting 
organization. (IA-8) (SI-2) [33]  
 Coordination of monitoring at external boundaries and the 
associated incident response activities.  (IR-4)(IR-7)(SI-4) [33] 
 Coordination of classifications/confidentiality levels and processes 
for regrading information among organizations. (MP-8) [33] 
 Utilizing context awareness to increase the security posture of the 
mobile device. This could include sensor information for 
authentication, inclusion of sensor information (location) in security 
logs, or using sensor information, i.e., context awareness, to 
enable/disable services (such as camera in SCIF). (AU-3) (IA-2) 
(IA-8) [33] 
 Planned deployment of security services (e.g., auditing, malicious 
code protection, Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), and 
monitoring software) on resource limited mobile devices. (AU-8) 
[33] 
 Mobile applications with high availability needs, as possibly 
required by DoD COIs, on a device built for consumer acceptable 
levels of availability. This would include analyzing the availability of 
mobile applications with high availability needs when a security 
event occurs (degraded operations mode). This would also include 
protection against possible DoS attacks on mobile devices by 
utilizing security event responses (wiping the device or lockout).  
(AU-5) (SC-6) [33] 
 Modifying the Identification and Authentication (I&A) on mobile 
devices.   
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 This could possibly be performed by utilizing a combination 
wireless tokens and sensor information (behavioral and 
biometric) for continuous authentication. (IA-2) [33] 
 mobile devices authenticating to each other and their 
sensors. (IA-3) [33] 
 Mobile device authentication to the user. (IA-2) [33] 
 Isolating, Sanitizing, or Downgrading information on single personality, or 
in the personality in its entirety. (MP-6)(SI-4) [33] 
 Non-persistent personalities for highly sensitive information (SI-14) [33] 
These mobile security policy topics are addressed in more detail in the 
future research section of the paper. 
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III. MOBILE DEVICE INFORMATION FLOW AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS  
A. SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STATEMENT 
A mobile device that is used for processing unclassified information for the 
DoD must implement a security policy for a given functionality. This security 
policy should cover where information flow is allowed and disallowed and where 
information must be guaranteed to flow. This information flow is derived from 
objectives an organization is trying to achieve. These objectives are obtained 
from the functional requirements and Organizational Security Policies (OSPs). 
The organizational policies originate from Executive, Federal, and Department of 
Defense (DoD) Information Assurance (IA) policies. These policies are then 
turned into security controls that govern the information flow of the system.   
As we stated above, we will begin with our functional requirements. These 
functional requirements will need to support use cases such as integrated 
personal calendars, real-time intelligence, automated supply, and remote health 
tracking. These use cases can be summarize into a functional summary for the 
device. This functional summary would be “a single mobile device that can 
process digital and environmental information from all aspects of a user’s life, 
while presenting such information at the right place and time in a consolidated 
manner. “    
Our proposed functionality summary would have to be accomplished, 
while still complying with the organizational security objectives we listed earlier in 
this document. Specifically we will focus on the organizational security objective 
derived from DoDI 5200.01 and Executive Order 13556, which states “Controlled 
Unclassified Information shall be identified and safeguarded.” [84]. We propose 
that such a mission statement and objective could be achieved through a device 
that has multiple personalities on a mobile device.   
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When we have a mobile device with multiple personalities that fulfills this 
mission statement, there are additional threats and complexities that arise in 
protecting DoD information. A large number of these complexities arise because 
multiple COIs may exist on a mobile device on a mobile device, with shared 
resource (e.g., storage, sensors, network interfaces), but the different COIs may 
have different security objectives and policies than those of the DoD. We have 
listed these security complexities and threats earlier in this document, but we can 
summarize them as follows: 
 Non-DoD COI, with a different security policy, compromising the 
Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability (CIA) of a DoD personality  
 User activity in non-DoD COI’s personality generating CUI or 
sensitive information that requires protection 
 Non-DoD COI allowing the mobile device to perform DoD restricted 
functionality due to the time or environment 
 A command issued to a mobile device generates an activity that 
compromises CIA of DoD information due to context and 
personality 
 The physical loss or tampering of the mobile device 
 Mobile device not properly enforcing the COIs policies 
 Conflicting COIs policies 
 Manufacture or ISP compromising the CIA of a DoD personality 
These threats should be addressed by our selection of security controls 
that drives the security policy and information flow on such a mobile device.   
In summary, our security policy objective is to protect DoD information on 
a mobile device. 
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B. CONCEPTS FOR IMPLMENTING MOBILE DEVICE SECURITY 
We have now identified the security objective to protect CUI from a DoD 
perspective. We did this while also identifying our functional requirement of a 
single mobile device that can process digital and environmental information from 
all aspects of a user’s life, while presenting such information at the right place 
and time in a consolidated manner. We now link these requirements and 
objectives to an information flow and discuss how this information flow could be 
implemented with our previously discussed controls. 
Considering our first use case of an “integrated personal calendar” as an 
example, we suppose there are multiple independent security domains on the 
mobile device. We continue to refer to these domains as personalities. 
Idealistically each one of these domains would be isolated from the others to 
guard against our previously developed threat list. Except that we wish to provide 
the user a common interface. Figure 11 illustrates this concept. 
 
Figure 11.  Multiple Personality Mobile Devices 
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In Error! Reference source not found., we have three COIs with defined 
information owners that provide remote content and services. The information 
owners in the above example are the device holder (e.g., personal life), employer 
(e.g., professional organization), and military. Each establishes or provides 
allowable services within that personality. These COIs then map to a personality 
on the mobile device, for which they have ownership. The mapping between 
COIs and personalities is not necessarily one-to-one. For example, the ISP or 
manufacture may be a COI with no direct personality presented to the user. 
Since there will be multiple COIs with their own security policies on the devices, 
we would want to ensure integrity and confidentiality of the COI owned 
information. This could be accomplished while making the information available 
by presenting it in a way that is beneficial to the user, through a unified interface. 
Consequently, we have the need for a referee for the personalities: a universally 
trusted process to act as the reference monitor [77] to manage the information 
flow. 
The question then becomes what COI would drive the access control 
policy enforced by the reference monitor. From a DoD protection of CUI 
perspective, the DoD would consider their personality as the top hierarchy and all 
others as equal subordinates. Whereas, from the perspective of any other COI, 
they would consider their personality at the top of the hierarchy. As such, we find 
that the hierarchy depends on the point of view of each COI. Additionally, our use 
cases do not assume a defined number of personalities. There can be any 
number of personalities added to the mobile device as needed by the owner.   
We recognize there are many approaches to implementing a mobile 
device information flow to protect DoD CUI. One can have a 100 percent DoD 
device implementing NIST controls, a “centralize information flow enforcement” 
where DoD is defining the enforcement based on the NIST controls, or a de-
centralized approach where each COI defines the information flow for their 




to mobile devices. Considering these controls, security objectives, our use 
cases and threats we find the following list useful in guiding the development of 
the desired information flow: 
 AC-4, Information Flow Enforcement [33]: This control guides the 
application of mechanisms such as domains, isolation, and data 
labeling. 
 AC-16, Security Attributes [33]:  This control ensures information is 
attributed to a particular domain or security level. In our terminology 
this control would label the information for a particular personality. 
 AC-19, Access Control for Mobile Devices [33]:  Organizations will 
have usage restrictions the mobile device would have to support in 
an automated fashion if possible. An example would be turning off 
capabilities such as Wi-Fi or sensors such as the camera.  
 AC-25, Reference Monitor [33]:  Any device must have a trusted 
layer which provides basic security assertions required to meet the 
COI security enforcement. 
 SC-16, Transmission of Security Attributes [33]:  This control 
ensures information is attributed to a particular domain or security 
level when transmitted to and from the COI services. 
 SC-8, Transmission Integrity and Confidentiality [33]:  This control 
ensures the mobile device provides the mechanisms to ensure that 
confidentiality and integrity is maintained between the personality 
and COI.   
 AC-XX Events Driven Access Control: This control ensures the 
mobile devices provides mechanisms to dynamically alter the 
information flow based on environmental context awareness. 
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 SC-XY Multiple Independent Security Domains:  This control 
provides guidance for mechanisms supporting independent multi-
personality information flow. 
These controls will be considered in the following section along with the 
proposed implementations of mobile device information flow enforcement. 
 
C. APPROACHES TO MOBILE DEVICE INFORMATION FLOW 
ENFORCEMENT 
Now that we have defined the organizational objectives and security 
controls that govern our information flow, we can begin to define the information 
flow for the mobile device. For this to take place there must be management of 
the information flow to determine the hierarchy and mediation of conflicts among 
security policies. We demonstrate centralized and decentralized with trusted user 
conflict resolution as two possible approaches of enforcing this information flow, 
along with the conflicts and concerns that occur with multiple security policies on 
one mobile device.    
In centralized enforcement of the information flow on a mobile device, a 
single organization explicitly coordinates or determines the device policy. For 
devices processing CUI, it would likely be the DoD defining the enforcement 
based on the NIST controls. In decentralized management of information flow on 
a mobile device, each organization on the mobile device defines their own policy.   
The device must then be capable of implementing each policy and their 
combination resultant policy, while allowing the user to resolve conflicts. In both 
approaches, one applicable implementation mechanism is a “reference monitor” 
[77]  to fulfill AC-25 [33] control requirement listed above. We will use these two 
approaches to illustrate the questions, conflicts, and concerns with managing an 
information flow using multiple security policies on one mobile device. 
In decentralized management of information flow on a mobile device, each 
organization on the mobile device defines its policy.   The device must then be 
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capable of implementing each of these policies and their combination resultant 
policy, allowing the user to resolve conflicts. In both approaches, one 
implementation mechanism to apply is a “reference monitor” [77]  to fulfill AC-25 
control requirement listed above. We will use these two approaches to illustrate 
the questions, conflicts, and concerns with managing an information flow using 
multiple security policies on one mobile device. 
1. Decentralized with Trusted User Conflict Resolution 
Decentralized information flow enforcement allows each COI to define 
their security policy and resultant information flow, while allowing the user to 
perform conflict resolution between the COIs on the mobile device.   To enable 
this, we have divided the standard notional mobile device architecture [74] 
(depicted below in Figure 13) into three layers of information flow enforcement. 
These layers are device, personality, and resulting set. The device layer is 
composed of the hardware, firmware, and OS contexts. This layer performs as 
the reference monitor and enforces mandatory access control between the 
domains, or personalities, based on labels for each CUI. The second layer is the 
personality. It consists of the application and information contexts in the diagram 
below, except that each layer would be reproduced for every personality on the 
mobile device. The personality layer provides the COI defined security policy and 
information flow. It is important to note that each personality provides its own 
distinct access control list. This list is bounded by the available system 
resources. The third layer is the resulting set of all the personalities and the 
device’s information flow enforcement layer. The resulting information flow is 
bounded by the device level information flow enforcement.  
 98
 
Figure 12.  Standard Notional Mobile Device Architecture After [74] 
In decentralized management with trusted user conflict resolution, each COI 
brings at least one personality layer, which resides on the device layer. The 
combination of these layers provides the system policy. This combination may 
cause conflicts at personality integration or runtime.    With this information flow 
management type, the user is verified and trusted by each personality on the 
device to resolve these conflicts at both installation and runtime. This has some 
similarities to Android’s application permission model [85], and may have 
comparable benefits and drawbacks [86] when it comes to conflict resolution. The 
identification of these conflicts and the potential concerns is the intent of this 
section. 
a. Personality Information Flow Enforcement 
One of the first controls we would want to asses in this 
methodology is AC-4 [33]. Specifically, ensuring that the flow of information 
generated by the user or environment only reaches the correct personality. One 
dynamic approach of assuring this flow would be blocking information flow to all 
personalities but one based on the environment or user perceived threats. An 
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example of this would include the AC-19 supplemental control of prohibiting the 
use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within the unclassified 
mobile device. This would take place at the device layer of information flow 
enforcement, where all other personalities are locked out through either user 
initiation or by an external environmental event.   In a user-initiated lock out, the 
user simply activates one personality. Alternatively, said another way, the user 
can deactivate all but one personality. A lock out could be initiated when a certain 
context event occurs. For instance, imagine there is a lab where the COI security 
policy objective only allows the single use of the “lab personality” while 
employees are located in the lab. One could imagine the mobile device, 
communicating with some proximity sensor, where the device is used as a token 
to grant access to the user. In this scenario, the mobile device would recognize 
this event, triggering the mobile device to launch the correct personality and 
block the operations of any other personalities on the device. When the 
employee scans out of the lab, the device then clears the lock out and returns all 
other personalities to operation. The immediate question is what to do with 
conflicts? 
First, we assess the environment. What do the personalities on the 
device represent and are they comparable?  In the case where the personalities 
represent different comparable levels of security such as in the national security 
description of Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret, the requirement goes from 
not only being able to lock out other personalities but also being able to restrict a 
personality to operating only during certain events. Take our lab scenario, what if 
the lab where classified?  This would assume the lab personality is classified, 
therefore one would not only want to lock out the other non-classified 
personalities, one would also want to ensure the lab personality locks itself out 
when the device is not in the lab. This could present a problem because what 
happens if the context is not received for exit from the lab?  Would the 
policy/mechanisms allow the user to clear the personality lock?  If that were 
allowed, the required mandatory access control could be defeated.   
 100
Applying the mandatory personality lockout scenario to non-
comparable environment we find there still exists the possibility for conflict. In this 
environment, the multiple personalities are separate domains, but they are non-
comparable from a security level consideration.  
 
Figure 13.  Personality Conflict Demonstration  
Using Figure 13, we discuss a few scenarios which can lead to 
conflicts. It may be useful to think of the circles as representing physical spaces 
and the trigger event being location. However, the circles could represent any 
scope of a trigger event, the concept we are exploring is when there are overlaps 
and how those conflicts should be resolved.   
As the user causes the trigger event for personality Y, the mobile 
device may lockout all other personalities. This is the easiest case since the user 
is only “in” the one scope. However, if the user chooses to enter the lab, the 
scope of personality X, how should the mobile device handle the conflict since X 
exists entirely within Y?  In this scenario, we could imagine that the lab physical 
access control process is the context for changing the information flow. Maybe 
the lab only allows the user to enter once the device is set to the X personality 
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with the information flow for all other personalities blocked. Otherwise, the user 
would have to leave the mobile device outside the lab.  (It is also worth noting 
how the environment could have indirect control over the overall security policy. 
Consider the case where a third party Lab requires visitors to leave their mobile 
device outside the lab. This sacrifices our availability for their confidentiality. In 
this case the environment adds another layer of complexity to the actual 
implementation of our COI security polices.)   
What if the user moves to the area of point 2?  The user is currently 
using the Y personality information flow but moves into a territory where the Z 
personality information flow overlaps. Should the user get a notification?  In this 
scenario, we propose the user would have to be the mediator.   
Going back to the previous example, if the lab was not a physical 
place but just a scope that existed entirely inside the Y scope, the user would 
have to mediate the conflict, otherwise the X personality would be entirely locked 
out from use and we could potentially see a denial of service vulnerability in our 
construct. In fact, one possible construct of this information flow is that the user 
can always mediate the personality conflicts and set a particular personality to 
lock out all others, and release lockouts.   
We note that this is a discretionary access control approach of the 
personalities, the user controls the access, and therefore this mechanism does 
not work for scenarios where the personalities require some form of MAC, 
outside of the user’s discretion. 
Alternately, conflict resolution could be determined at personality 
installation. During this time, the information flow of the personalities could be 
reviewed against the new personality and conflicts could be determined. In this 
way, the installer (user/administrator) could be asked to resolve the conflict by 
selecting a personality to take precedent or we could simply choose to lock out 
both personalities. 
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In the case where the user can decide the precedence, the 
opportunity exists for the user to violate a COIs information flow intention. For 
example, imagine the Lab X personality is installed and then the user installs the 
area Y personality. When the conflict is identified the user then selects area Y to 
take precedence. Therefore, when the user enters the Lab with their mobile 
phone it will remain in the Y personality and violate the X personality information 
flow. From a DoD perspective, if X represented a DoD personality this would 
violate our security policy objective. Essentially, this form of conflict resolution 
maintains a MAC access control but trades confidentiality for availability of the 
user’s preferred personality. 
In the case where conflicts are resolved by disabling both 
personalities during conflict we are essentially saying the device is unusable 
during all personality conflicts.   In these cases, the intent is to protect the 
confidentiality of a given personality, this means all other personalities must 
cease to be able to use the mobile device in the given context. Therefore, when 
locking out all the personalities that believe they have a need for confidentiality 
we essentially lock out the entire device. In this case, we are again keeping the 
MAC access control but now trading availability for confidentiality. 
b. Sensor Information Flow 
Since the use of wearable computing devices and sensors with 
mobile devices is increasing, attention will have to be place on this information 
flow for all forms of management (e.g., centralized or decentralized). These 
sensors will be a shared resource for information about the outside world to the 
different domains, or personalities, available on the mobile device. The 
information owners associated with each of these personalities (or COIs) will 
determine the information protection needs for their data. As such, we believe 
specific attention will need to be place on controlling the flow of information 
between the sensors and the different personalities on the device. In order to 
accomplish this, we are defining a potential information flow to provide each 
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domain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability needs for the information 
provided by these sensors. These “sensor” flows will change depending on the 
environment of the mobile device.  
The context of the user’s situation may determine the sensitivity of 
the information obtained from a sensor. That sensor information may be sensitive 
for one COI (e.g., military), but get recorded for another COI (e.g., personal). For 
example, when an application is retrieving sensitive (e.g., CUI) sensor 
information in a military domain, it may be the case that the personal domain 
should not be allowed to pull the same sensor information concurrently or even a 
second later. Additionally, sensors could exist on the device that should only 
provide information to one personality.   
One confidentiality example could be the Scanadu SCOUT [25], 
which provides health information that the user may only want provided to the 
“personal” personality. One availability example could be an additional more 
accurate military GPS sensor that provides constant uninterrupted GPS to the 
military COI only. These are some of the concerns that we are looking to solve 
with the information flow described in this section. 
The information flow we propose does not require coordination 
among COIs on a mobile device, or a coordinated security policy.   Each COI 
would provide its own sensor policy upon deployment of a personality. That 
policy could consist of 4 fields, which are defined as follows: 
1) Sensor—A unique identifier for a sensor’s service, below the 
personality level, for which the policy is being created. Examples of 
these sensors could include GPS, Camera, fitbit [9], Scanadu 
SCOUT [25], or Square [15]. If two GPSs are attached to the 
device, the sensor is still classified as a GPS sensor.  
2) Allowed—A field that identifies if that sensor is allowed to be 
utilized by the COI.  
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3) Context Trigger—A context trigger is a field that contains environmental 
events, called “context events,” that would restrict the use of a specific 
sensor by all other COIs until the environmental event passes (e.g., 
entering or leaving a circular area centered on a GPS-identified location).   
We call this restriction on the use of sensors an “Information Flow Block” 
(IFB). This IFB helps protect the confidentiality of the sensor information in 
a given contextual event. Examples could include location, time, motion, 
variance of sensor information, or ownership (see below). 
4) Owned—A special permanent context trigger that grants the COI full 
ownership of a sensor with no other COIs having the ability to access its 
information. This field is here to provide greater availability or 
confidentiality for a sensor’s information to a particular COI. 
An intersection of the policies of each COI on the mobile device is 
then used to enforce the information flow based on “security policy load,” “context 
triggers,” and “sensor access requests.”    
Even though no coordinated security policy exists among the COIs, 
there may be times when the security policy will need to be mediated among 
personalities. One reason for such a mediation could be to allow or disallow a 
personality from block the information flow on a sensor to all other personalities 
on the device through broadly defined context triggers (e.g., time is infinity, or 
GPS location is the entire earth). This mediation would likely need to take place 
prior to the triggering context event occurring, otherwise there are risks of 
compromising a personality’s confidentiality, integrity or availability.    
That is way we chose to have “conflicts” and “threshold” checks 
upon personality load and security policy changes (e.g., changing context 
triggers or ownership). Conflicts are when two personalities have the same, or 
overlapping context triggers. An example would be two COIs requesting 
exclusive access to GPS information in overlapping geographical areas.   
Thresholds would have to be predetermined or user defined thresholds 
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established on which personality owns or controls the information flow blocking of 
a sensor. An example of a threshold could be a context trigger with a 500-mile or 
larger radius around a GPS coordinate provided by a COI.   One approach to 
resolve these “conflicts” and “thresholds” might be to have the user make a 
determination on if such “conflicts” and “thresholds” are acceptable on the mobile 
device. If such an approach was used, a personality could be loaded or security 
policy changed upon the following criteria being met: 
 Upon personality load or change in security policy, the user is 
notified of conflicts among personalities. The user is also notified 
that any context events for which there are conflicts, the 
corresponding sensor will be disabled for all personalities. The user 
is then provided the option of continuing to load the personality, or 
completely back out of the load. If back out is chosen, the 
personality is not loaded and security policy remains the same.  
 The user is notified of any context event thresholds that go beyond 
the defaults on the mobile device or previously user defined. These 
thresholds could include ownership, time equaling infinity, or an 
extremely large GPS area.   The user is then provided the option of 
continuing to load the personality, or completely back out of the 
load. If back out is chosen, the personality is not loaded and 
security policy remains the same.   
It is important to note that throughout the criteria above, the user 
will never be able to change a COI’s provided security policy. They are only able 
to agree or disagree with the effects that loading a personality will have on their 
device, thereby agreeing to load the personality or not. 
The next piece of establishing the information flow is an 
“Information Flow Block” (IFB), which is initiated when a context-based event 
occurs for a specific personality, as annotated in their sensor policy. Examples of 
these events could include a GPS location, time, or proximity of a wearable 
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computer (i.e., uniform or access card). The IFB of the sensor is then released 
upon leaving the contextual event. The information flow for a sensor information 
flow bock request is as follows: 
 
Figure 14.  Mobile Device Information Flow—Information Flow Block Request  
 
Using the information flow in Figure 15, one approach for a 
personality to provide an information flow block of a sensor would be if the 
following three criteria were met: 
1) The personality is allowed access, based on the COIs policy, to the 
requested sensor that initiated the context event.  
2) The requested sensor that initiated the context event is not owned 
by another COI. This is a potential conflict, which is discussed 
below.  
3) The information flow to the requested sensor that initiated the 
context event is already blocked by another COI. If such a block is 
present, than there is a conflict which is discussed below. 
Of the criteria above, two and three have the possibility of a conflict 
occurring with other personalities on the device. The first conflict exists if another 
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COI owns the sensor for which a context block is being requested. Since a COI’s 
sensor ownership overrides any other CIOs access to a sensor, this conflict is 
immediately resolved by automatically denying the requested information flow 
block. The second conflict occurs when two or more COIs have an information 
flow block for the same contextual event. An example would be two COIs 
requesting exclusive access to GPS information in overlapping geographical 
areas. This conflict is not automatically resolvable since no one COI has 
precedence over another, so the sensor is locked to all personalities on the 
device until one of the contextual events passes. Continuing, a contextual event 
could be leaving the geographical area that has the overlapping contextual 
trigger.     
A “sensor access request occurs” when a personality requests 
access to a specific sensor. This information flow for this request is as follows:  
 
Figure 15.  Mobile Device Information Flow—Sensor Request  
Using the information flow diagram above, a personality receives 
sensor access if the following three criteria are met: 
1) The personality is allowed access to the requested sensor based 
on the COIs policy.  
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2) The requested sensor that initiated the context event is not owned 
by another COI. This is a potential conflict, which is discussed 
below.  
3) The requested sensor is not blocked by another COI. If such a 
block is present, than there is a conflict which is discussed below. 
Of the criteria above, two and three have the possibility of a conflict 
occurring among other personalities on the device. Both of these conflicts are 
encountered when another personality has temporary or permanent exclusive 
access to the sensor, resulting in the requested access being denied. 
Now that we have defined the information flow for sensors using 
personalities, we believe that it would be useful to provide an example set of COI 
sensor policies. These example policies would then be used to analyze their 
impacts on the threats we described above. These examples involve a user with 
both a military and personal personality. Our proposed sensor policies for these 
two personalities are as follows.   
 
SENSOR  ALLOWED CONTEXT TRIGGER 
Camera Yes 1) 30 mile radius around deployed 
location 
GPS Yes 2) 30 mile radius around deployed 
location 





Table 3. Military COI Sensor Policy (provided at personality load) 
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SENSOR  ALLOWED CONTEXT TRIGGER  
Camera Yes No 





Table 4. Personal COI Sensor Policy (provided at personality load) 
 
COI SENSOR ALLOWED IFB 
ACTIVE
OWNED 
Military Camera Yes Yes No 
Military GPS Yes Yes No 
Military Fitbit [9] Yes No No 
Personal Camera Yes No No 




Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5. Mobile Device Sensor Policy 
 
The three scenarios, based on sensors, that we will be assessing 
against this policy are “Silence is Information,” “Walk in the Woods,” and a part of 
“User Privacy,” discussed in section I.D3. We will be assessing these threats 
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present in these scenarios by following a military user through activities that 
show these potential threats and how the policy might address them.   
Silence is Information: While at home, a military user finishes 
posting his last picture of wooded scenery prior to leaving for deployment on a 
sensitive mission. Before leaving the house, he puts on his uniform that contains 
embedded military sensors that can communicate to his mobile device. These 
sensors trigger a change in context for the mobile device, in accordance to 
context trigger 3 of the Military COI Sensor Policy. This restricts his GPS location 
to the military personality, blocking the information flow to all other personalities. 
Since his friend tracking service in his personal personality was constantly pulling 
GPS location information, it only locates him with his last known location. In this 
case, that location would be his home (not miles from the deployed location).   
He then jumps in his car, turns on his military GPS navigation software, and 
heads off to fly out.  
 A Walk in the Woods: A short while later, this military user enters a 
cargo aircraft for transportation to the deployed location. After a long flight he 
comes within 30 miles of his destination. This change of contexts activates 
context trigger 1 of the Military COI Sensor Policy. This context trigger restricts 
his camera to his military personality only. As he arrives and steps out of his 
aircraft, the military user notices some curious wooded scenery. He takes out his 
mobile device and attempts to take a picture to post to his favorite social network. 
Since the camera is now restricted to his military personality, that photo is not 
possible. As he starts to put his camera away, he notices something interesting 
regarding local insurgents in that same wooded region.   He pulls his camera 
back out and takes a picture, which he immediately shares using an intelligence 
application.   
User Privacy:  After a short walk to his barracks, he once again 
pulls out his mobile device. In doing so, he accidently attempts to access his 
health information from his Scandu SCOUT [25] in his military personality. Since 
his mobile device sensor policy states that the Scandu SCOUT [25] is owned by 
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his personal COI, the access is denied. Thus preventing the military personality 
from accidently accessing his private health information. 
c. Personality and Unified User Experience Information 
Flow 
We believe that there should be a unified user experience that 
presents the information from different personalities in a consistent consolidated 
fashion for at least a defined subset of the functionalities provided by each 
personality. But as stated earlier, personalities are implemented through domains 
on the device with the information on the device controlled by the information’s 
owners, or COIs. Each of these COIs bring a security policy to implement on the 
device, with no explicit information flow among the personalities owned by 
different COIs. Nevertheless, we believe that a unified experience should still 
exist. We propose that this might be accomplished through trusted applications. 
Examples of such applications could include notifications, phone application, 
email application, calendar application, contact application, and messaging 
application.   
Trusted applications are high assurance applications trusted to 
aggregate or control the flow of information from separate COIs for presentation 
to the primary user of the mobile device. The information presented by a trusted 
application would be in compliance with predefined fields, or a summary. In other 
words, it would not present the entire contents of that COI’s application, just a 
summary, to protect the confidentiality of this information. Each COI would be 
able to define what information could be presented in this summary, or if any 
summary should be available at all. For example, the email application may have 
the following predefined fields available: sender’s email address, subject line, 
and time. When selected the trusted application would launch the corresponding 
application in the personality of the information selected. For example, if a 
military COIs email was selected the email application of the military personality 
would be launched. The initial information flow might be as follows: 
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 Each COI would select which trusted applications it would 
like to interface with in the trusted application portion of its 
policy. 
 Each COI would label the information that it would like to be 
presented to the trusted application based on the label 
documented in the trusted application portion of its policy. 
The information flow among the trusted applications and 
personalities would be as follows: 
 The trusted application is allowed to read the corresponding 
application’s labeled summary information within other 
personalities in accordance to the defined COI policy.   For 
example, the trusted email application can read the email 
addresses, subject line, and time from the personal and 
military personalities on the device.  
 The trusted application is allowed to execute the 
corresponding application within a personality. For example, 
when a military email is selected in the trusted application, 
the military personality is launched with its email application.  
All other information flows among the personalities and trusted 
application are prohibited. A diagram of this information flow is listed below, 
where TPalpha is the trusted application with which the user interfaces. 
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Figure 16.  Trusted Application  
 
d. Analysis 
Now that we have described our approach to the information flow 
enforcement on mobile devices, we can compare it against the controls we 
previous noted as being particularly useful in guiding the implementation. We 
analyze, for each control, how our approach satisfies the intent: 
 SC-XY Multiple Independent Security Domains:  In our 
approach, we define separate personalities that maintain 
security levels isolated from each other personality. These 
personalities also decide what information is available, read 
only, to the provided trusted applications, for example the 
consolidated calendar user case. 
 AC-XX Events Driven Access Control:  In our approach, the 
information flow is dynamically altered based on 
environmental contexts that are defined by the information 
flows of each personality/COI. 
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 AC-4, Information Flow Enforcement [33]:  The mobile 
device layer provides the mechanism for this control. 
However, as identified in our scenario, this mechanism is 
diminished by the possibility of conflict between each 
personality. 
 AC-16, Security Attributes [33]:  This control supports the 
information flow by labeling information according to the 
personality. Our approach currently assumes container 
separation where the container is the personality and there 
is context aware control of the sensors. Our approach does 
not include the use of security labels. However, an 
alternative approach would be to use security labels at either 
the personality level or the file level. It may also be useful to 
implement labeling within the personality in order to 
distinguish between levels of sensitivity of information. For 
instance, the DoD personality may require labeling for PII or 
other types of CUI. 
 AC-19, Access Control for Mobile Devices [33]:  Our 
approach implements personality information flow block outs 
at the functional and sensor levels to implement 
personality/COI policies. Container-based encryption could 
be used to isolate personalities. 
 AC-25, Reference Monitor [33]:  The mobile device layer 
would provide the reference monitor functionality to enforce 
the information flow. The flow of information from sensors 
and to and from the trusted applications relies on the 
reference monitor which implements the “events driven 
access control.”  
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 SC-16, Transmission of Security Attributes [33]:  This control 
supports the information flow by maintaining the label of 
each piece of information during personality or COI the 
transmissions. Our approach currently assumes container 
separation. However, an alternative approach would be to 
use security labels. 
 SC-8, Transmission Integrity and Confidentiality [33]:  
Communications between the Personality and COI services 
are implemented with encrypted communications provided 
by the applications within the personality layer as needed 
based on the “events driven security context.” 
We find that there are potential conflicts that arise when multiple 
COIs reside on a device without a coordinated security policy, especially where 
the personalities’ security levels are non-comparable. These conflicts occur when 
the security policies among two or more COIs overlap. Since these COIs’ 
security policies are non-comparable, no one policy takes precedence over 
another. This has the potential of leading to a security policy violation for one or 
more of the COIs which have the overlap. We identified a possible way to 
approach these conflicts through user mediation at either time of conflict or 
personality install.    
The first option allows the user to select the personality that should 
take precedence, leaving the user to decide which personality represents the 
user’s current actions on the mobile device. But in doing so, this options creates 
a DAC policy and allows the user to potentially violate a COIs security policy. The 
second option allows the user/administrator(s) to address the conflicts ahead of 
time, at personality install, and therefore maintain a MAC policy and increase the 
confidentiality level provided. But in this option, the availability of a personality 
could be sacrificed along with the following additional potential drawbacks of: 
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 Conflicts being presented in too broad or too detailed of a 
fashion, leaving the user not able to truly understand the 
conflicts 
 The user may “just click through” or past the conflict to 
complete the personality installation ignoring or not aware of 
the conflicts that could arise 
 The user may not have all the requisite information to make 
such an appropriate decision 
 
2. Centralized 
In this demonstration, a centralized information flow enforcement allows 
one COI to define the security policy and resultant information flow for the mobile 
device. This could be done through a COI mandating their own specific 
information flow, coordinating a security policy with other COIs, or perform 
conflict resolution among the COIs on the mobile device.   In this demonstration, 
we selected the DoD to be this centralized managing organization.   
a. DoD Centralized Management  
These approaches are very similar to our decentralized approach 
except that the DoD either owns the device, coordinates a security policy, or 
performs conflict resolution. Each of these approaches has its own benefits and 
negatives for the user and DoD.   When the DoD owns the device, they provide 
the device to the user with only one or two personalities, which could be “DoD-
only” or “DoD and personal.”  The DoD only device already exists and would not 
meet a majority of our use cases, so that would not be an option. The DoD and 
personal personalities would meet a portion of our use cases, except any other 
COIs (e.g., professional organizations or second jobs) would not be able to 
provide their own personality. In this approach, the DoD resolve, through the use 
of AC-19 MOBILE DEVICE ACCESS CONTROL, all conflicts by giving 
preference to the DoD personality, thereby protecting CUI at the cost of 
availability to personal personality. 
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In the coordinated security policy approach, the DoD would chair a 
coordination meeting with the other COIs to create a security policy that is 
comparable with a hierarchy or resolve all policy conflicts at that time. This option 
would meet all of our use cases, but is not feasible since the DoD is not likely to 
sit at the table with every possible COI. Hence this approach not a likely or 
feasible option.  
In our last approach the DoD’s policy is at the top of the hierarchy, 
above all other COIs, for conflict resolution. The DoD resolves, through the use 
of AC-19 MOBILE DEVICE ACCESS CONTROL, all conflicts by giving 
preference to the DoD personality, thereby protecting CUI at the cost of 
availability to all other personalities on the mobile device. In this approach 
someone would still have to resolve the security conflicts among all the non-DoD 
personalities on the device. 
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A. SUMMARY  
As we conclude this thesis, our research shows there are many security 
concerns regarding multiple personality mobile devices given the current 
technologies and policies. We have illustrated how all these issues arise in 
examples but research will have to be conducted to determine how best to 
resolve them. We have provided some examples of this research below. Where 
possible, we have also provided potential references to help guide this research, 
and demonstrate the work that has already taken place on these topics. Finally, 
in our conclusion we summarize our approach to mobile device security, analysis 
and results. 
B. TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
1. Declassifying, Sanitization, and Downgrading 
There may be some issues with implementing the process of isolating, 
sanitizing, or downgrading a single piece of information on a personality, or the 
personality in its entirety. When performing these actions on a personality, it 
would be ideal to not negatively affect the other personalities on the device. For 
example, if there is an incident (security violation) that occurs on one personality, 
it would be ideal to have that personality completely isolated from the others on 
the device, while leaving the non-affected personalities available. If the threat is 
deemed to be large enough, it would also be ideal to have the capability to 
remotely wipe individual files or entire personalities without destroying the non-
affected personalities. There are similar concerns with sanitizing and 
downgrading information.  
In regards to sanitizing, currently documents like the “NSA/ Central 
Security Service (CSS) storage device declassification manual,” require 
sanitizing solid state devices by “smelting in a licensed furnace at 1,600 degrees 
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Celsius or higher or disintegrate into particles that are nominally 2 millimeter 
edge length in size using an NSA/CSS evaluated disintegrator” [87].  For flash 
memory, sanitizing is performed on “Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-
Only Memory (EEPROM) by overwriting all locations with a known unclassified 
pattern” [87].  While in the NIST SP 800–88, they recommend that PDAs have all 
information manually deleted, along with performing a manufactures hard rest to 
the factory state. [88]  All four of which, would destroy all other personalities on 
the devices since it destroys the data across the entire drive. It would be 
interesting to see if there is a sanitization process that would leave the other 
personalities intact, some sources that may help with this research include: [89], 
[90], [91], [92], and [93]. 
Along the same line of thought, with the introduction of sensors, the 
classification of data may be dynamic, for example depend on the context. The 
classification of sensor data may change as we showed section I.D.3 “silence is 
information” example. The ability to dynamically manage the classification of this 
information among personalities, along with the ability to correct errors that 
occur, could be a topic for future research.  
2. Non-Persistent and Thin Personalities 
In regards to cyber-attacks against highly sensitive or widely exposed 
personalities, it may be useful to mitigate against advanced persistent threats by 
significantly reducing the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of 
opportunity and available attack surface). This could be done by making the 
targets non-persistent through “domain virtualization” with automatic 
deletion/restoration on mobile devices.   
There may be times that the data is so sensitive that you would not want 
the applications or data to leave the corporate network or even confined the data 
to a specified physical area. This problem may potentially be resolved or 
mitigated by having a “thin” personality that is only available on the corporate 
network within the corporate physical building.   When the mobile device is not on 
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the corporate network and within the physical confined area, the personality 
would no longer be present. The papers that could help assist with this future 
research are: [94] and [95]. 
3. Information Flow among Personalities, Sensors, Network 
Infrastructures, and Enclave 
The use of wearable computing devices and sensors with mobile devices 
is increasing. A large topic for future research would be the information flow 
among personalities, sensors, and wearable computing devices. This topic is 
multifaceted and involves integrity, confidentiality, and priority of access.  
For confidentiality, as described in section I.D.3 with the example “Silence 
is Information,” the environment or context of the user and mobile device may 
determine the sensitivity of the information obtained from sensors. Based on this 
context, sensor information may be sensitive for one COI (e.g., military), but 
another COI may consider the same information publicly releasable (e.g., 
personal). The question then becomes: when an application is retrieving 
sensitive (e.g., CUI) sensor information in a personality, such as DoD, should a 
non-DoD personality be permitted to pull the same sensor information 
concurrently, or even a second later?  This is not the only confidentiality issue. 
Wearable computing devices are also going to provide access to additional 
personally identifiable and health related information (described in section I.D.3 ). 
The management and release of such information, and more, may be controlled 
by laws, regulations, and privacy concerns that would need to be addressed 
(e.g., HIPPA and PII). Hence, the information flows of sensor data is an essential 
confidentiality concern. The easy solution would be to turn off these sensors and 
wearable computers, but a good future research topic would be to discover how 
to securely enable this technology in the appropriate personality and achieve the 
benefits it could provide. 
The integrity of information provided may also be essential to these 
wearable computing and sensor devices. Vital decisions may be made based on 
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the information provided by these sensors, such as military locations for the DoD 
or health status for the person. We would want to ensure that the correct 
information is coming from the correct sensor. One way to accomplish this is by 
providing mutual authentication between the personality and wearable computing 
devices/sensors.   This way there is assurance that the information provided by 
these sensors is actually coming from the correct source.   It would also be an 
interesting research topic to determine the feasibility of assuring the information 
from these sensors is accurate, and not being falsified or modified. 
Availability may also be essential for personalities and their wearable 
computing/sensor devices. Applications may require continuous uninterrupted 
access to a sensor. In order to ensure the confidentiality of information from 
these sensors, different COIs may also want to ensure that no two personalities 
have access to a sensor at the same time for a given situation. It is resolving this 
inherent conflict that would be a topic for future research.   
4. Information Flow among Personalities, Network Interfaces, and 
COI Infrastructures 
Mobile devices have expanded the possible ways of obtaining network 
connectivity. In fact, the methods of accessing various network infrastructures 
may increase and become even more complex (e.g., mesh networking). When 
you combine this with multiple personalities existing on a device with various 
security needs, the topic becomes more interesting and more complex. That is 
why the information flow controls between the personalities and the network 
interfaces and enclaves is an area of future research.   
The first area that needs to be addressed is, communication using the 
mobile service carriers. Currently most mobile device’s external boundaries are 
managed by mobile service carriers. These boundaries would need to be 
monitored. This may need to be addressed through a strong partnership with 
mobile service carriers. An interesting question is, who owns the results from  
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monitoring activities. Another approach could be VPNs back to the COI 
organizations network defense. In this case, there are several layers of 
monitoring that would have to be integrated. 
The next area that needs to be addressed, and is a potential area of future 
research, is communications taking place over alternate interfaces and 
infrastructure. By alternate interfaces and infrastructure, we mean mechanisms 
other than the COI’s or ISP’s provided network infrastructure.   The enablement 
of this functionality, dramatically increases the availability of both functional and 
security services. The most mobile unique example of such an infrastructure 
would be mesh networking [11]. Secure communications over these mesh 
networks, may be an important subject for future research. A potential approach 
would probably include unique device-to-device identification and authentication. 
5. Privacy and User Rights 
When a device is owned by multiple stakeholders, one of which is the 
user, privacy and user rights concerns come fore. These concerns arise from 
items such as auditing/monitoring, incident response, ownership of device/data, 
and configuration management. The level of privacy and user rights must be 
clear to the user to avoid invalid  assumptions and misconceptions.”  They must 
also follow current rules and regulations, with possible modification to such rules 
and regulations being required. The rule and regulation modifications that might 
be required and how they could be securely implemented is a topic of future 
research.  
6. Official Time Source among Personalities  
Many services on mobile devices require an accurate and coordinated 
time source. Examples of such services include diverse areas such as Code 
Division Multiple Access (CDMA), auditing, and incident response. Different COIs 
may have different requirements for time synchronization across services 
deployed on the personalities. In addition the different COIs may insist on using 
different “time sources.” These conflicting time synchronization requirements 
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could cause issues with incident response or even CDMA.   An example would 
be if the policy requires the device to sync to a COI approved time source. 
Resolving or providing infrastructure to support these different times sources and 
applications needs to be studied further. Device-level use of UTC derived from 
GPS is possible (though able to be spoofed [96]) solution.  
7. Mobile Carrier Access to Device 
Current policies restrict the commercial mobile carriers access to mobile 
devices.   Currently in the commercial sector, most patching/upgrading of the 
mobile devices is performed through privileged access provided by mobile 
service carriers. Resolving this apparent conflict between industry trends and 
DoD policy can be an area of future research. Possible solutions could include a 
strong partnership with mobile service carriers to uniquely identify and 
authenticate such access. This would also include a way to provide a level of 
authenticity and verification of accuracy for patches (i.e., DoD signed patches).   
Other solutions could include patching based on COI and personality, where the 
mobile carrier only provides patches to the COIs whose security policies allow it.  
8. Coordinating Classifications/Confidentiality Levels 
 As mobile device personalities span different COIs, or organizations, the 
classification guidance for information stored on these devices may vary. This 
could cause security conflicts when such information is stored on the mobile 
device. An example of such a conflict could include, an organization considering 
one piece of information classified, while another organization considers it CUI. 
This could  affect data flows, access controls,  and overall classification of the 
device. Understanding, documenting and providing mechanisms for dealing with 
and/or resolving such conflicts should be addressed.    
9. Utilizing Context Awareness for Security 
Just as context awareness on mobile device can provide additional 
functionality not previously possible, the same is true for security services.   
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Context aware security applications could be utilized to enforce security policies 
in a way that simplifies security management for the user. Examples could 
include authentication, security logs, or enabling/disabling services (such as a 
camera in a SCIF). In fact, the commercial industry is already moving in this 
direction. Apple has filed a patent to enable different levels of authentication 
based on the phones location [97]. Finding and implementing these context 
aware services to increase the security posture of mobile devices while making 
life easier for the user is a topic of future research. One example of such a 
service for future research is detailed below:  
Certain policies that made sense for the docked systems may not make 
sense for mobile devices that are context aware. We propose that pin and 
passcodes is one of those policies that may not apply to mobile devices. Forcing 
a pin or passcode prior to obtaining information from a mobile device might 
hinder functional use cases, or cause potentially dangerous security exceptions 
(as described in section I.D.3 with the example “alerting terrorists of U.S. friendly 
forces”). The user must still be authenticated to the device, but potentially using 
something other than a pin and token to provide something you have, know, and 
are. This is made possible because the device has the capability of context 
awareness along with additional detailed information about its user. A 
combination of something you have and something you are might be a preferable 
authentication mechanism.   
The something you have, could be an authenticator (something you have) 
that is wearable, embeddable, or even able to be swallowed. This would then be 
combined with a biological or behavioral patter (something you are). This would 
allow users to stay authenticated to the device as long as the devices is “close” 
to the user. A passcode could then be used in a “break glass” situation where the 
biological or other authenticator is lost.   Clearly more work needs to be done in 
this space to achieve the kind of assurances required for DoD and other uses. 
The integration of these capabilities with the different personalities also needs to 
be studied. 
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10. Security Services on Resource Limited Mobile Devices 
There are a wide variety of security services that are currently deployed 
on our docked information systems. Some of these services include auditing, 
malicious code protection, IPS, and monitoring software. Planned and prioritizing 
deployment of these security services on resource limited mobile devices would 
most likely have to take place. This analysis could include selecting or 
developing scaled down versions of these services and the integration of these 
services with the various COI infrastructures.      
11. High Availability Requirements  
Mobile devices maybe the primary communication medium for their users 
to the outside world and may need a higher level of assurance for availability 
than their notebook or desktop counterpart. This can be demonstrated with 
functions that were previously performed over radio on the battlefield or 
emergency service, and are now taking place on mobile devices. This could 
become a potential conflict when the mobile devices are built for a consumer 
acceptable level of availability. Further research should take place to determine if 
there is a way to mitigate this risk, while still taking advantage of the cost and 
ubiquity of these devices.  
Additionally applications that require high availability will require security 
protections such as DoS prevention, priority of communication services, and 
higher assurance of communication services/application. As we progress 
towards 4G/VOIP, DoS attacks and loss of availability may become more 
prevalent. Thus high availability may become more important. These availability 
requirements could be an area of future research, since they do not exist in 
current policy. Some example security approaches that could be included are 
redundancy in communication protocols and services; or a minimum set of 
communication applications available upon certain levels of device failure. 
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12. Choosing an Architecture for Mobile Devices with 
Personalities 
Developing or choosing an architecture for multiple personality mobile 
devices could be an area of future research. This study could possible include 
analyzing other architectures and frameworks, such as type 1 or type 2 
hypervisors. A part of this study could also include an evaluation of architectures 
and implementations currently on the market against the functional and security 
use cases for multiple personality mobile devices. Examples of potential 
architecture and implementation currently available for analysis include: 
 Green Hills Software [98] 
 OkLabs High Assurance Framework with LG [99] [100] 
 Red bend vLogix [101] 
 SELinux [102]  
 VMWare Mobile Hypervisor with Samsung [103] 
13. Choosing and Applying a Formal Security Model for Mobile 
Devices 
Current security configuration documentation for mobile devices, such as 
the DISA SRGs, does not require the use of a formal security model.   A possible 
topic for future research could be the selection and implementation of a formal 
model for mobile devices with multiple personalities. Such a model could be used 
to analyze the properties of such a system with a goal of providing assurances that 
the system will “behave as advertised.” 
C. CONCLUSION   
Through the course of this paper we confront the issues surrounding 
mobile device security for today and into the future. Our main questions were: 
 What is unique about mobile devices?   
 What is the affect to security policy?   
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 Are the security controls affected?   
 How is implementation affected?   
 Is there a solution for implementation?  
We address these questions systematically with the following results:  
1. What is Unique about Mobile Devices 
First, in Chapter I, we describe the problem by revealing what is unique 
about mobile devices. We first note how mobile devices are more “personal” than 
traditional computing devices in that they become much like a digital surrogate 
for the owner. Mobile devices are always on, always on you, and through their 
suite of sensors they are environmentally context aware. A more traditional 
computing device such as a laptop is typically used only for the purpose it was 
acquired. For instance, a work issued laptop is normally used in the work 
environment for work tasks. Whereas, at home one would have a personal laptop 
used for personal task and entertainment. Mobile devices, given their personal 
nature, tend to be used in both environments for both work and personal tasks. 
As such, there exists many different unique functional and security use cases for 
mobile devices. 
2. Security Implications  
In the process of examining the security implications of mobile device 
usage we identified the following use cases: 
 User Calendar–Consolidated calendar view of all personalities 
 Walk in the Woods–Location reporting for personal and DoD use 
 Crashing a Video Party–Video conferencing for personal and DoD 
use 
 Skyping from a SCIF–VOIP use for personal or unsecure 
communications and secure communications 
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Conversely, we noted the following cases that present specific security 
threats: 
 CEO All Hands for Harry Potter–the invite for this party is sent to 
the work email contacts list versus only the personal list as 
intended 
 Alerting Terrorist of U.S. Friendly Forces–Blue force tracking is 
running on a lost mobile device which then falls into the enemy 
hands 
 Uncontrolled Unclassified Information–CUI is unintentionally saved 
to a personal cloud service 
 False Notifications–a virus is downloaded on a less secure 
personality which masquerades as Blue Force Tracker application 
and successfully tricks the user 
 Free Wi-Fi and the Battlefield–the device automatically attaches to 
a random Wi-Fi service which provides false information to the 
device 
 Passwords, there is an App for that–a password management 
application stores passwords for all personalities on a less secure 
personality 
 User Privacy–Private information is revealed to an employer 
through device monitoring. Based on this information the employer 
decides to terminate employment the employee. 
 A Door to China–devices made in foreign nations may provide 
security holes or back-doors 
 Silence is Information–a user whose “find my friends” application or 
other social networking sites go inactive could indicate they are 
deployed 
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After analyzing these specific use cases and threats against current DoD 
security policy objects we found them sufficient for addressing mobile security 
policy information flow. We then analyzed the lasted draft of NIST SP 800–53 
revision 4 to determine the impact on the security control catalog. In this way we 
determined controls which were mobile interesting and required special 
consideration for mobile devices as well as those controls which were found to 
be mobile unique. We also noted there was a need for 3 additions to the NIST 
catalog as either an aspect of a current control or an entirely new control:   
 SC-XX Phone only Mode–Control to specify a requirement for 
implementing a mode whereby only the use of the mobile device 
phone service is available. 
 AC-XX Events Driven Access Control–Dynamic access control 
changes based on environmental context as perceived by the 
mobile device’s suite of sensors. 
 SC-XY Multiple Independent Security Domains–Specifies the 
requirement to implement multiple independent security domains in 
support of personalities, as well as how these domains would 
provide an information flow and how the information assertions 
would be implemented on the device via a universally trusted 
service such as a reference monitor. 
3. Proposed Approach 
Using our mobile unique controls as a guide, we developed several 
approaches to mobile manage device information flow including: 
 Decentralized Information Flow–Each COI defines the personality 
information flow enforcement independently from all other COIs 
 Centralized Information Flow–A dominate COI is selected which 
ensures its related personality has preference over all other 
personalities and either sets a precedence for all personalities or 
allows the user to resolve all conflict among all other personalities 
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4. Analysis and Conflict Identification 
We found that the decentralized approaches allow for conflicts between 
the information flow enforcement of personalities. These conflicts occur when the 
security policies among two or more COIs overlap, especially regarding sensors. 
Since these COI security policies are non-comparable, no one policy takes 
precedence over another. This has the potential of leading to a security policy 
violation for one or more of the COIs which have the overlap.   These conflicts 
are not easily resolved. The user could resolve the conflicts, but this would either 
defeat MAC access enforcement, sacrifice confidentiality, or sacrifice availability.   
Also in this approach, the user may not have the requisite information to make 
such policy decisions.   
We found in the centralized approaches, the same conflicts could also 
occur. Only, as the personality providing the over-all information flow 
management, the DoD, for instance, would ensure its personality is dominant. 
This solves the problem for DoD, but this approach may still violate overlapping 
information flow enforcement of the other personalities. This occurs unless the 
number of personalities is limited to the user and the one centralized organization 
or an unlikely agreement is reached among the COIs.  
There are certainly many other approaches to mobile device security. We 
described a number of ways in which mobile devices may be used in the future. 
We hope to have identified ways in which we can prepare now to meet those 
challenges. In the end, we perceive more conflicts between the use of the device 
and the information flow enforcement required by the different stakeholders, 
specifically the DoD. Such conflicts will have identified and addressed.    
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